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Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation: An analysis of cruise tourism in the Caribbean and its 
impact on regional destination ports 
 
Degree:     MSc 
  
 
This dissertation examines cruise tourism in the Caribbean and its impacts on the 
Small Island Developing States whose economies are all highly dependent on 
foreign injected capital.  This dissertation develops profiles for the Caribbean and 
cruise operators so as to better understand the context within which this research is 
undertaken.  
 
A cost benefit analysis is then done to establish the net impact of cruise tourism to 
the region. In that regard, an analysis is performed to determine the economic, 
environmental, security and social impacts of the industry on regional destination 
ports. Additionally, for islands with multipurpose berths, a further analysis is done to 
examine the impact of cruise tourism on the operations of liner shipping. 
 
Noting the high level of concentration in the industry as well as the trend of cruise 
operators to build mega cruise vessels a further examination is done to ascertain the 
capacity of destination ports to accommodate such vessels and the balance of 
power between cruise operators and destination ports. 
 
The dissertation concludes by acknowledging the positive impacts of cruise tourism 
but notes that this may easily be offset by the negative impacts of environmental 
degradation and the short-sightedness and lack of co-operation among destination 
ports. From the conclusions, five recommendations are thus made to develop the 
cruise tourism in the Caribbean in a sustainable manner where all major players can 
benefit in this collaborative effort. 
 
KEYWORDS: Caribbean, Concentration, Cruise Operators, Balance of Power, 
Destination Ports, Highly dependent, Lack of Co-operation, Sustainable Tourism 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background Information 
 
The Caribbean is the world’s leading cruise destination.  Its geographical location in 
a warm temperate zone, its strategic position relative to the US and its rich and 
diverse cultural heritage, makes it a must for any vacationer.  
 
These islands are, however, all considered to be small island developing states, with 
fragile economies and ecosystems which make them very vulnerable to socio-
economic and political developments in the world.  Though, their natural resources 
can easily be adversely affected by environmentally degradation, the trend of cruise 
operators to design and market their vessels to compete directly with land-based 
resorts, appears to have gone by unnoticed.  The magnitude of waste generated on 
a daily basis by mega-cruise ships, the high levels of congestion at heritage sites, 
the potential health hazards associated with gases such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
sulphur oxides (SOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2) found in the exhausts of marine 
diesel engines, are hardly ever considered by destination ports.  
 
Strangely enough, even when faced with falling market shares, destination ports in 
the Caribbean continue to invest in their port infrastructures as well as the 
development and enhancement of shore attractions.  Tourism is a major GDP 
contributor for economies of destination ports. In recent times, cruise tourism, has 
gained increasingly more importance than land-based resorts.  
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Interestingly to note, are the demands that are sometimes made by cruise operators 
on destination ports, and the corresponding threats to remove destination ports from 
itineraries, if a desired action is not undertaken.   
1.2 Significance of the study 
 
It is hoped that this research will help clarify the possible reasons why scant regard 
is given to the environmental impact of cruise tourism in the Caribbean. Also, an 
explanation, into why destination ports seldom co-operate when it comes to matters 
related to cruise tourism, as well as, possible reasons why cruise operators in the 
region appear to have relatively more negotiating power than destinations ports. 
 
The results of this research, though representing just the tip of an ice berg, should 
be used to formulate, develop and implement strategies to ensure the sustainability 
of the cruise tourism industry in the Caribbean.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
In seeking to perform an analysis of the above issues and to better understand the 
impact of cruise tourism on destination ports; this dissertation has the following 
objectives which serve as a guide to the research: 
 
1. To determine and evaluate the economic impact of cruise tourism in the 
Caribbean;  
2. To ascertain the balance of power between cruise operators and destination 
ports;  
3. To evaluate the capacity of destination ports to accommodate future mega-
sized cruise vessels;  
4. To determine the economic  and operational implications to liner shipping, of 
the priority berthing given to cruise vessels;  
5. To assess the ability of destination ports to meet their obligations as 
mandated by MARPOL 73/78 and provide port reception facilities for ship-
generated wastes? 
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1.4 Scope of the study 
 
This study, whilst analysing cruise tourism throughout the Caribbean is primarily 
geared towards the islands of CARICOM that are engaged in cruise tourism. 
Contrary to the customary method of researching a sample then making 
generalisations about the population, this study does the opposite. Cruise tourism is 
researched in the context of the Wider Caribbean (the population) and the results 
are used to reinforce conclusions of a sample, which in this case, are the destination 
ports of CARICOM. Likewise, recommendations are developed specifically for 
CARICOM destination ports.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
Exploratory research was undertaken to determine the availability, content and 
relevance of data to the key issues emphasised in the objectives of this dissertation. 
Extensive use was therefore made of the books, journals, periodicals, articles, 
acquired from the library at the World Maritime University. Additionally, reference 
material was acquired from the Saint Lucia Air & Sea Ports Authority, was also used 
to gain insights into the operations and inter-relationships between cruise operators 
and destination ports, and among destination ports.  Extensive use was also made 
of internet sources to build upon the information gained from secondary research.  
 
To verify and check reliability of port info and to determine if any developments had 
taken place subsequent to that obtained in secondary sources, questionnaires were 
sent to thirty three stakeholders in the industry. The response rate was so dismal 
that the author had to resort to making telephone calls, to several Caribbean 
destinations, where personal interviews were conducted with Marine Pilots and 
other key port officials involved in the cruise sector.  
 
Chapter 2 gives a regional profile of the Caribbean. Factors which have made the 
Caribbean the most sought-after cruise destination are examined and the region 
divided into five segments. The respective market shares and islands within the 
segments are identified. 
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Chapter 3 introduces the major cruise operators within the region and gives a useful 
insight into the market shares and representative agencies of Carnival Corporation 
& plc, Royal Caribbean Cruise Limited and the Star Group. An analysis is performed 
on their financial statements which were obtained through secondary research.  
 
Chapter 4, through a cost benefit analysis, evaluates the direct and indirect impacts 
of cruise tourism and compares it with impacts generated by air pollution, ship-
generated wastes, absence of port reception facilities, social and security impacts 
as well as the economic and operational impact on liner shipping caused by the 
priority berthing given to cruise vessels. 
 
Chapter 5 evaluates the capacity of destination ports to accommodate very large 
cruise vessels. In this chapter, greater emphasis was placed primary research and 
the relevant information was acquired from marine pilots and other senior port 
officials in the various destination ports. The balance of power between cruise 
operators and destination ports were examined in the context of the level of 
concentration among cruise operators, the substitutability of destination ports, 
market representation, level of co-operation between destination ports, the 
dependency of destination ports on cruise tourism. 
 
Chapter 6 gives a strategic analysis of cruise operators and destination ports whilst 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions and proposes recommendations for a more equitable 
and sustainable tourism industry in the Caribbean. 
1.6 Limitations of study 
 
In this research, only the major cruise operators with brands promoting mass 
tourism were considered. Recognition is given to upcoming leader MSC Cruises and 
the fact that alongside the mega lines operate smaller vessels which may make a 
more meaningful contribution to destinations ports than mega cruise vessels.   
 
Substantial evidence was made available courtesy of Teri Shore, of Friends of the 
Earth International, showing where cruise vessels admitted to dumping waste in the  
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Caribbean. However, it was very difficult to determine if the waste was processed as 
per industry standards or if innovative devices such as Marine Sanitation Devices 
(MSDs) Type II or Advanced Wastewater Purification Systems (AWPSs) were 
operating as they should.  Efforts to obtain further information from the Caribbean 
Environmental Health Institute (CEHI) were futile. CEHI, established by CARICOM 
in 1988, and with responsibilities for environmental impact assessment and 
environmental health information, had never done any studies on the environmental 
impacts of cruise tourism. Lastly, great difficulty was encountered in obtaining 
feedback from a number of cruise lines.  This made it impossible to do a more 
comprehensive analysis on the financial standing of cruise operators since no 
industry bench marks were available for comparison purposes with their respective 
financial ratios. 
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2 The Caribbean-a regional profile 
 
2.1 Historical Profile 
 
The history of the Caribbean has been one shaped largely by the migration of 
people into the region from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the 
colonisation by the Spain, England, France, Holland, Denmark and Swedish to a 
lesser extent.  
 
The first inhabitants of the Caribbean were the Caribs and Arawaks, Amerindians 
who migrated from South America and who were mistakenly taken for Indians by 
Columbus. Thinking that he had arrived in India, he erroneously proceeded to call 
the region the West Indies, and notwithstanding that the islands were already 
inhabited, claimed a number of islands in the name of King Ferdinand and Queen 
Isabella of Spain.  
 
The Spanish occupation of the Caribbean resulted in the enslavement of indigenous 
races in gold mines and agricultural estates. After their eventual decline and demise, 
they were replaced in 1501 by Negro slaves, first from Spain and then West Africa.  
The dominance of Spain in the Caribbean is adequately explained by Williams (1970)  
who stated that political climate in the fifteenth century was one which was 
congenial to discovery and overseas expansion. The presence of gold, sugar and 
slaves in the Caribbean represented an enormous accession of wealth and power. 
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Spanish dominance in the region remained largely unchallenged until the early 16th 
century when Spain’s enemies in Europe, the colonial powers of the British, French 
and Dutch began to question that very dominance. One such person was Francis І, 
King of France who minced no words in voicing his protest when he said, “The sun 
shines for me as well as others. I should very much like to see the clause in Adam’s 
will that excludes me from a share of the world! God did not create these lands for 
Spaniards alone” (Williams, 1970, pp. 71-72). 
 
During the mid-1500s and mid-1600s they succeeded in eroding Spain’s supremacy 
and went as far as encouraging and authorizing their citizens to attack Spanish 
merchant ships, fleets and ports (http://encarta.msn.com). Contrary to today, where 
the International Maritime Organization, with the backing of its member states have 
enacted resolutions to curb the illegal and often destructive act of piracy, Williams 
(1970)  reports that the piracy during that period had the backing of colonial powers 
and had essentially become a feature of the national policy of Spain’s enemies in 
Europe.  
 
The 18th and 19th centuries were of particular significance to the Caribbean for it was 
a period where occurrences during that time had long lasting effects and played a 
critical role in shaping the region’s history.  Such occurrences include but are not 
limited to: the intensive rivalry between the British and French for regional 
supremacy; the introduction of sugar cane, the profitability of which resulted in all 
available lands being utilized for its cultivation and thus the preference to its 
exportation and the importation of food; the abolition of the negro slave trade in 
1807; the commencement of migration into the Caribbean by Indians in 1838, 
Chinese in 1859, and Japanese in 1894;  and the Spanish-American War of 1898 
which put an official end to Spanish power in the Caribbean (Williams, 1970). 
2.2 Regional Resources 
 
Until the mid-20th century many Caribbean Islands, with the possible exception of 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, relied heavily on their agricultural sectors for 
economic growth and sustainability (http://encarta.msn.com). With globalisation and 
its accompanying trade liberalisation, between nations and within economic blocks, 
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the guaranteed market given to the agricultural products of many islands were 
adversely affected.1  As a result, these islands diversified into tourism and relied less 
on the dwindling returns of their agricultural produce. Even Trinidad, with its 
petroleum, asphalt and natural gas and Jamaica with its supplies of iron ore and 
bauxite have followed suit and diversified into tourism as well. 
In that regard, the term regional resources refer to all types of resources used for the 
promotion and development of the tourist industry and particularly, cruise tourism. 
Such resources would include attributes derived from being located in a warm 
temperate zone with breathtaking coral reefs, lush vegetation, spectacular beaches, 
clear blue seas, volcanic remains, rugged mountains and indigenous species of birds, 
reptiles and marine life. The islands, which were formed by partially submerged 
mountain ranges, volcanic activity and some from coral, which emerged from the 
ocean (http://encarta.msn.com), lie in close proximity to each other and are 
affectionately considered by many, as a tropical paradise with sunshine all year 
round.  According to Moonie et al (1998, p. 153) one of the strong points of the 
Caribbean is the large number of accessible islands, which allows cruise ships to 
offer their passengers “port-a-day” cruises without having to travel at high speeds to 
arrive at the next port of call. 
 
In terms of institutional resources, the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) is the most notable and recognized in the region. Comprising of 13 
Member States and 5 Associated Members, the political leadership of CARICOM, in 
the aftermath of September 11, 20012 joined forces with regional and international 
tourism bodies to develop an emergency response to save from ruin, the Caribbean’s 
most vital economic sector, the tourism industry. On 1 January 2006, the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME) was established thus enabling member states 
to benefit from greater negotiating power, pooled resources, improved ability to 
recruit skilled workers, source inputs from resource rich locations, and achieve 
                                                 
1 World Trade Organization ruling against the preferential treatment given to Caribbean bananas on 
the European Market resulted in the loss of jobs to many farmers who could not compete with US 
(Chiquita) owned farms in Latin America. 
2 This date signifies the launching of deadly and devastating attacks on New York City, and 
Washington, D.C., USA 
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greater economies of scale thus enhancing its external competitiveness 
(www.caricom.org).  
2.3 Political Climate 
 
The islands of the Caribbean are very politically diverse as a direct consequence of 
their colonial history.  Williams (1970, p. 70) posit the view that the Caribbean’s 
history was conceived in international rivalry which was reared and nurtured in an 
environment of power politics.  It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if one 
expects the political climate in the region to be one of instability, characterized by 
turmoil and an environment, which is not conducive to business, especially that of 
cruise tourism. 
 
On the contrary, when one thinks of the Caribbean, the first thing which comes to 
mind is an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity.  Although the region comprises 13 
independent nations and a number of dependencies, territories, and possessions of 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and Venezuela 
(http://encarta.msn.com), they all coexist in warm and cordial relations between and 
within their respective boundaries, worlds away from political instability and its 
associated ills. 
 
Even within the confines of CARICOM political fragmentation exists.  However, as 
illustrated by Hanratty (1989), most islands inherited strong democratic traditions 
and parliamentary systems of government that were patterned after the Westminster 
model. Furthermore, to ensure that democracy and political stability were 
entrenched in the region, CARICOM, at its 10th Conference of Heads of Government 
agreed to the establishment of the Assembly of Caribbean Community 
Parliamentarians (ACCP). This effectively gave the parliamentary opposition in the 
respective islands, an opportunity to make their contribution to the Community’s 
decision making process (www.caricom.org). Additionally, Caribbean leaders have 
expressed great opposition to the establishment of a regional defence force on the 
premise that such a force might eventually threaten the very democracy it was 
established to protect (Hanratty, 1989). 
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 2.4 Home and Destination Ports 
 
There are basically two types of cruise ports, which Canamero (2005) identified as 
Base or Home Ports and Way or Destination Ports.  Home ports are the beginning 
and termination nodes of a cruise and provide key logistical services to cruise 
vessels, their passengers and crews. They are often regarded as one of the key 
players in the cruise industry.  Conversely, destination ports are more oriented 
towards the provision of tourist attractions and would plan and coordinate a variety 
of excursions to coincide with the vessels’ stay in port.  
Monie et al (1998, pp.177-181) identified two categories of port selection criteria 
(Table 1) used in the Caribbean to determine whether a destination should be 
included on a ship’s itinerary. These attributes, when combined with the destinations 
image, form what is referred to as the intrinsic value of the destination.  They, 
however, emphasize that having a high intrinsic value does not necessarily mean 
the automatic selection of a port, especially if the location of that port does not allow 
it to be visited within the time constrains of the cruise. 
 
Table 1: Port selection criteria 
Port-related attributes Island-related attributes 
AA accessibility of the port BA beaches and water sports BJ special attractions 
AB berth availability BB cultural diversity BK sports facilities  
AC berthing facilities BC popularity of the destination BL tourist information  
AD passenger reception 
facilities BD friendliness of locals BM tourist safety 
AE ports dues/head taxes BE local transport BN uniqueness  
AF reliability of sailing schedule BF political stability BO weather conditions 
AG smooth immigration process BG restaurants/bars   
AH tender service BH shopping   
AI vessel security BI shore excursions     
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p178. 
Conversely, when it comes to home-port selection, the port-related attributes in 
Table 1 are of equal importance. This is because of the ever increasing size of 
cruise vessels, security considerations and the expressed need of cruise lines to 
control their costs.  However, as a result of the array of logistical activities 
undertaken at home ports, other factors must also be given consideration. Such 
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factors include the availability and cost effectiveness of airlift, vessel support and 
provisioning facilities, availability of hotel accommodation, efficiency and 
effectiveness of transferring large numbers of cruise passengers between air and 
cruise terminals, and crew recreational facilities (Monie, Hendrickx, Joos, Couvreur, 
& Peeters, 1998).  
 
The major home ports for the Caribbean are Miami, Port Canaveral, and Port 
Everglades/Fort Lauderdale on the Florida coast and the port of San Juan, Puerto 
Rico3 located in the Caribbean (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006, p. 57).  Coincidentally, the 
Florida home ports are ranked among the top five cruise destinations in the world, 
with Miami and Port Everglades being ranked as number 1 and 2 respectively, and 
Port Canaveral as number 4 Wild & Dearing (as cited in Gibson, 2006). 
 
Prior to 9/11, in order of priority, the top four preferred destinations in the Caribbean 
as illustrated in Figure 1 were the Bahamas (23%), St. Thomas (20%), Puerto Rico 
(14%), and Cozumel (13%).  This point is substantiated by Monie et al (1998, p.155) 
who indicated that in 1996, the four leading destinations were the Bahamas, the US 
Virgin Islands (mainly St. Thomas), Cozumel (Mexico), and Puerto Rico (mainly San 
Juan). 
St. Thomas 
(USVI)
20%
St. Marteen
10%
Puerto Rico
14%
Jamaica
9%
Bahamas
23%
Cayman 
Islands
11%
Cozumel
13%
 
Figure 1: Compound Share of Caribbean Market from 1990-1999 
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142 
 
The fear of flying in the aftermath of 9/11 and the expressed desire of North 
American passengers to cruise closer to home resulted in the establishment of 
several homeports along the US Gulf Coast.  This had the dual effect of reducing 
the market share of major home ports of Miami, Port Everglades, and Port 
                                                 
3 Puerto Rico, the fourth largest of the Caribbean archipelago, is a U.S. commonwealth 
(http://encarta.msn.com) 
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Canaveral and gave cruise operators the opportunity to develop new cruise 
itineraries in the Western Caribbean (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006; Peisley, 2006). 
The total number of passengers visiting the islands in Figure 1 from 1990 to 1999 
(47.4 million) increased by over 10 million for the period 2000 to 2004 (57.6million).  
Figure 2 illustrates a movement away from the traditional destinations of Puerto Rico 
and St. Thomas, whose shares decreased by three and four percentage points 
respectively, in favour of Cozumel, which as a direct impact of 9/11, experienced an 
increase of six percentage points.  The growth of Cozumel is positively correlated to 
the increased home-porting at the Gulf ports (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006). 
St. Marteen
9%
Jamaica
8%
Puerto Rico
11%
Cozumel
19%
Cayman 
Islands
12%
Bahamas
25%
St. Thomas 
(USVI)
16%
 
Figure 2 Share of Caribbean Market from 2000-2004 
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142 
2.5 Market Segmentation 
 
Monie et al (1998) divided the Caribbean into four segments:  the Western, Eastern, 
Southern and the Deep Caribbean. They included the Bahamas as a fifth segment 
due to their importance and proximity to the Caribbean market.  It must be noted, 
that the Bahamas have a much closer relationship with the Caribbean than mere 
proximity to the region and actually became a Member State4 of CARICOM on 4th 
July 1983 (www.caricom.org).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Community but not the Common Market 
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Table 2 Geographic segmentation of the Bahamas and Caribbean cruise market 
Bahamas Western Caribbean Eastern Caribbean 
Southern 
Caribbean Deep Caribbean 
Freeport Cayman Islands Antigua, British Virgin Barbados Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, 
Nassau Cancun Islands, San Juan,  Dominica Cartagena, Grenada, 
Coco Cay * Cozumel Saba, St. Barts, St. John, Guadeloupe Isla de Margarita, 
Pleasure Is*. Jamaica St.Kitts & Nevis, St. Maarten, Martinique La Guaira, 
Princess Cays* Key West,  St. Thomas, Virgin Gorda, St. Lucia,  Panama Canal, Puerto, 
Royal Isle* (Cuba) Labadee*, and Serena Cays* St. Vincent Cabello, and Trinidad &  
      Princess Bay* Tobago 
    Home Ports    
Miami Miami, Montego Miami and San Juan 
San Juan, 
Miami, San Juan, Aruba, and 
   Bay, and Tampa   and, Barbados Montego Bay 
    Cruise Duration    
1-day 4-days 7-days 7-days 7-days 
3-days 7-days 10-days 10-days 10-days 
4-days  11-days 11-days 11-days 
* Private out-Island    
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p161, (Original source: William S.A. Da Costa Gomez, prepared for the Sint Maarten 
Port N.V., Sint Maarten Cruise Tourism Action Strategy. P.15) 
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Figure 3 Market Share of the Bahamas and Caribbean Cruise Market from 1986-1996 
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p174 
 
During the period 1986 to 1996, as is depicted in Figure 3, the Eastern Caribbean 
was the preferred Caribbean destination followed at a considerable distance by the 
Bahamas, Western, Southern and Deep Caribbean respectively. Collectively, during 
that period, the Deep, Southern, and Eastern Caribbean represented the largest 
market share of cruise passengers. 
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Figure 4 Market forecast of the Bahamas and Caribbean Cruise Market from 1997-2004 
Source: Monie et al, 1998, p174 
 
Figure 4, when compared to Figure 3, shows the Western and Southern Caribbean 
segments experiencing significant growth at the expense of the Bahamas and 
Eastern Caribbean destinations.  The possible reasons for these developments 
according to Monie et al (1998) were hurricane damage to Eastern Caribbean ports, 
which would increase market share in the Southern Caribbean from 15% to 22%,  
request for new itineraries by repeat passengers, and a high-profile marketing 
campaign currently being undertaken by the western port of Cozumel. Additionally, 
according to Monie et al (1998) the creation of a 4-day Western Caribbean itinerary 
would have profoundly affected the Bahamas and result in a drop of market share 
from 21% to 13% as illustrated in Figure 4.  
Western 
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Figure 5: Market Share of the Bahamas and Caribbean Market from 1997-2004 
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006, p80 & WTO, 2003, p142 
 
There is no way 9/11 or its impact on the cruise industry could have ever been 
foreseen.  Fear of flying adversely affected San Juan as a home port and, as 
depicted in Figure 5, consequently led to the erosion of the Bahamas, Southern and 
Deep Caribbean’s market share in favour of the Western Caribbean ports, which 
were regarded as the most convenient cruise destinations.  The most noticeable 
change was the fall in the Southern Caribbean’s market share by 6% rather the 
forecasted increase of 7% shown in Figure 4. 
2.6 World Ranking 
 
From its discovery during the colonial era; as a generator of economic wealth to its 
colonial masters, to its rediscovery during the 20th and 21st centuries as a tropical 
paradise, the Caribbean has always been the world’s most sought after destination. 
The modern concept of the cruise grew up around Miami as a base port, North 
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American passengers and the islands of the Caribbean as destination ports. Since 
that time, the Caribbean has maintained its position as the most preferred 
destination in the world, and is seen to have consolidated that rank (Figure 6) in the 
years following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 on New York City   
(Gibson, 2006; Monie, Hendrickx, Joos, Couvreur, & Peeters, 1998; Peisley, 2006; 
Wilmsmeier, 2006; WTO, 2003)       
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Figure 6 Combined World Cruise Tourism Market share of the Bahamas and the Caribbean.  
Source: own figure based on data from study WTO 2003 p. 134, Monie et al, 1998, p, www.f-cca.com
 
Prior to 2001, as illustrated in Figure 6, the Caribbean gradually began losing its 
market share of the world total cruise market and experienced a reduction from 
52.7% in 1987 to 45.8% in 2000.  Some of the reasons for this decline have been 
attributed to the transfer of the Caribbean cruise experience to other world locations, 
changing demography and tastes of cruise passengers, and the wearing off of the 
region’s novelty. This downward trend was however reversed in the aftermath of 
9/11, but as Americans slowly began to recover from that traumatic event, the 
gradual loss of market share continued, as is evident in 2006.  
2.7 Chapter Analysis  
 
The islands of the Caribbean have been very successful, not only in making the 
transition from agricultural to tourism-based economies, but also in ensuring that the 
region’s intrinsic value was sufficiently high to keep it as the world’s premiere cruise 
destination. 
 
The globalization of the Caribbean cruise experience as well as the changing 
demography of passengers has from 1987 resulted in the steady decline of the 
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Caribbean’s market share and had it not been for the events surrounding 9/11 would 
probably have had a smaller market than what exists today.  
 
Terrorism, and in particular acts of terror against the United States, have had 
adverse and contractive effects on the cruise industry. Though the Western Segment 
of the region appears to have benefited from 9/11 (Figure 5), this event has had the 
following effect: it has driven cruise operators to realise the high risks associated with 
depending too heavily on the North American market 5  and as a means of risk 
minimization, they have intensified efforts to diversify their destinations by working 
towards the continued globalisation of the North American cruise experience (WTO, 
2003). This development, as well as the fading novelty of the region, will see the 
continued erosion of its market share irrespective of the gains made after 9/11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 In 2000, North Americans accounted for 2/3 of world cruise demand (WTO, 2003). 
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3 International Cruise Operators 
 
3.1 Operator Profile 
 
The main drivers behind cruise tourism are the cruise operators and in the 
Caribbean as well as worldwide, the major operators are Carnival Corporation & Plc, 
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd, and the Star Group.  
 
Carnival Corporation was initially launched as Carnival Cruise Lines in 1972 and 
became a public company in 1987. It is the world’s largest cruise company and is 
well-known for its multi-brand approach for serving its diverse markets. It is the 
parent company of AIDA Cruises, Carnival Cruise Lines, Costa Cruises, Cunard 
Line, Holland America Line, Ocean Village, P&O Cruises, Princess Cruises, P&O 
Cruises Australia, Seabourn Cruise Line, Swan Hellenic, and Windstar Cruises6.   
        
North America
72%
UK
9%
Germany
4%
Other Europe
12%
Australia
3%
        
Figure 7 Geographic Distribution of Carnival Corporation & plc – end 2005 
Source: (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006, p. 87)   
                                                 
6 In 2006, Windstar Cruises was sold to Ambassadores International Inc. for US$100 million 
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 Figure 7 reveals that Carnival operates on a global scale with 72 percent of its 
business based in North America, 25 percent in Europe and 3 percent in Australia. 
The globalization of the company’s operations was enhanced when it acquired P&O 
Princess Cruises in 2003; a strategic move which assisted the company in 
diversifying its risk and relying less on the North American market. The effectiveness 
of this diversification strategy is illustrated by the reduction in revenue earnings from 
their main market from 75 percent in 2002 to 59 percent in 2004. In 2005, (Table 3) 
fifty six of its seventy nine ships representing 78 percent of its total carrying capacity 
operated in the North American market (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,24 &100; Peisley, 
2006, p. 34; WTO, 2003, pp. 64-76).  
. 
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. (RCCL) is the world’s second largest cruise company 
with a total of 5 brands.  It was launched in 1970 as Royal Caribbean Cruise Line 
and became a publicly traded company in 1993. In 2005, the majority of this 
company’s fleet was based in the Caribbean and RCCL owned three brands with 30 
ships and an approximate carrying capacity of 3.1 million passengers. The unveiling 
of the new brand Azamara Cruises in May 2007 signified a radical change from the 
company’s single global brand strategy.  RCCL, who now appears to be adopting 
Carnivals’ multi-brand approach, was accredited in 2006 as having the largest cruise 
vessel in the world viz. Freedom of the Seas (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,109; Miller, 
2007a).  
  
The Star Group consists of 3 brands, which had (in 2005) fifteen ships with a 
combined carrying capacity of 1.3 million passengers. It is the third largest cruise 
company in the world. Similar to Carnival and RCCL, the majority of its fleet 
operates in the North American Market with 2 brands having between them 79 
percent of the Group’s capacity. From its inception in 1993, Star Cruises operated 
predominantly in the Asian market but in 2006 a decision was taken to operate one 
vessel in the Mediterranean for the summer of that year  (Mathisen, 2005, pp. 18,24 
&107; Peisley, 2006; WTO, 2003). 
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The key players identified above are responsible for globalizing the Caribbean 
cruise experience and the subsequent revolutionization of the cruise industry. The 
emergence of mega lines in the cruise industry, consolidation and high levels of 
concentration, gave rise to economies of scale as well as economies of scope. 
Economies of scope, according to Jones and Hill (1998), are realised when two or 
more business units share resources and thus benefit by investing less in the 
shared functions. Such cost savings had a downward effect on the cruise related 
costs and subsequently made cruising cheaper and more affordable to a wider cross 
section of the global society.   
3.2 Market Share 
 
In 2005, the three top operators as illustrated in Table 3, had a combined share of 
81.4 percent of the worldwide cruise market with Carnival Corporation having 48%, 
Royal Caribbean Cruises with 23.6%, and the Star Group with 9.8%.  With regards 
to the North American Market, which serves the Caribbean, the combined market 
share was 90.1% with the following distribution: Carnival Corporation 49.9%; RCCL 
30.3%; and Star Group 9.9% (Mathisen, 2005, p. 18 & 24).  
 
Table 3: Largest cruise companies worldwide and in the North American Market-2005 
Cruise Company Ships Capacity Market Share 
 Worldwide
North 
America Worldwide
North 
America Worldwide 
North 
America 
Carnival 
Corporation 79 56 6 357 438 4 971 976 48.0% 49.9% 
RCC 30 28 3 127 294 3 021 550 23.6% 30.3% 
Star Group 15 12 1 296 800  985 200 9.8% 9.9% 
Summary 124 96 10 781 532 8 978 626 81.4% 90.1% 
Source: Compilation of various tables in Cruise Industry News 2005, p18, 24 
 
Carnival Corporation & plc has the largest market share worldwide and in the North 
American/Caribbean Market.  The company’s huge investment in marketing and 
advertising has been singled out as one of the key elements for its rapid growth.  In 
2005, with a total of 12 brands7, the first and largest being its very own, 79 ships 
and a world wide capacity exceeding 6.3 million, Carnival was considered the 
                                                 
7 Carnival Lines is the first and largest brand in the fleet. 
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largest cruise company in the world. During 1989 to 1999, five brands were added to 
its fleet and an additional six were obtained through the merger with P&O Princess 
plc in 2003.  In terms of number of ships, capacity, and market share, Carnival is 
followed at a considerable distance by RCCL, which merged with Celebrity Cruises 
in 1997, and the Star Group, which acquired Norwegian Cruise Line\Orient Lines in 
2000.  Carnival’s market leadership is well established and not even the combined 
market shares of RCCL and Star Group are able to topple it from its position of 
dominance (Mathisen, 2005; Peisley, 2006, p. 34; WTO, 2003). 
 
The costs associated with tonnage acquisition, the developmental and marketing 
aspects of running cruise vessel operations including fuel consumption, and home 
and destination ports charges, can be quite phenomenal.  This, as well as the fierce 
competition which exists within the cruise industry, has prompted cruise operators to 
ensure strategic initiatives are implemented for effective cost control.  As a result, 
the industry has become highly consolidated as is evident in Table 3 where Carnival 
Corporation, RCCL and the Star Group have combined market shares exceeding 
80% and 90% of the worldwide and North American markets respectively. The 
extent of market concentration is easily detected in Table 3 when one realises that 
the top two operators together control more than 80% of the North American Market. 
The predominant method of growth within the industry has been that of mergers and 
acquisitions. The most significant merger to date has been between Carnival 
Corporation and P&O Princess plc, to form Carnival Corporation & plc.   
3.3 Financial Performance8 
 
A financial analysis of a company and/or its competitors normally gives an excellent 
indication of the effectiveness of a company’s strategy, the efficiency with which this 
strategy is executed and suitability of its organizational structure. The 2000-2004 
accounting data given for the world’s three major cruise operators (G. P. Wild 
Limited, 2006, pp. 97-102) will thus be used to obtain an insight into the operations 
of these three companies. 
                                                 
8 This section is based on an analysis of Appendix A 
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3.3.1 Explanation of ratios 
As illustrated in Appendix No. A, the financial ratios have already been calculated 
hence, before attempting to do an analysis a brief explanation of their significance is 
given below: 
• Profitability ratios: these ratios measure the long-term solvency of a 
company and are good indicators of the efficiency with which a company’s 
resources are used.  
• Liquidity ratios: gives an indication of how easily a company is able to pay 
its current liabilities should they become due.  
• Efficiency ratios: indicate how efficiently a company utilizes its assets.  
• Financial leverage/gearing ratios: an indication of the long term solvency 
of the company. The higher the gearing ratios, the more critical is the 
company’s financial situation and the more vulnerable it is to bankruptcy if 
sufficient profit cannot be made to cover its principal and interest obligations. 
3.3.2 Carnival Corporation 
In 2004, one year after its merger with P&O Princess plc where it obtained an 
additional six brands to its portfolio, Carnival Corporation experienced about 123% 
increase in sales over its sales figure of US$ 4.37 million for 2002.  
• All computed profitability ratios, with the exception of earnings per share, 
showed a decrease from 2000 to 2003 but started increasing from 2004 
onwards. Again this was a result of increased sales from the aforementioned 
merger. Earnings per share, the only ratio to have steadily increased during 
the review period stood at over $2 for the first time in 2004 and increased to 
just under $3 in 2005. 
• Liquidity ratios steadily increased from 2000 to 2004 but declined to 2000 
levels in 2004. This is because current liabilities were increasing at a faster 
rate than their current assets. For example, in 2004 and 2003 current 
liabilities were $5m and $3.3m and when compared to the same period 
current assets stood at $1.7m and $2.1m respectfully. Prior to the merger 
(2002) the company was much more liquid with current liabilities standing at 
$1.6m compared with current assets of $1.1m. Current assets are therefore 
insufficient to pay current liabilities should they become immediately due.  
 21 
 
• Gearing ratios: These have fluctuated from 2000-2004 reaching a high of 
65.2% in 2003 and a low of 45.4% in 2002.  Currently, more than 50% of the 
company is financed by debt. This is a significant reduction from 2003 levels 
which, as previously mentioned was 65.2%.  As is evident in from 2003 
onwards, over 12% of the company’s profits (EBIT) are being used to pay 
interest on long-term debt.  
3.3.3 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd 
Steadily increasing sales from 2000-2005 were seen by Wild (2006)  as a result 
of improved trading conditions arising from increased demand for cruises. 
• The computed profitability ratios have fluctuated from 2000 to 2003; 
however, 2004 figures show them reaching 2000 levels. Earnings per share, 
which steadily decreased from 2001, were in 2004 at 2000 levels of over $2. 
Figures for 2005 showed a remarkable increase to over $3. The improved 
profitability of RCCL signifies that the company became more efficient in the 
allocation and distribution of its resources. This, it is assumed, is particularly 
so in light of the increased dominance of Carnival Corporation & plc following 
its 2003 merger with P&O Cruises plc.  
• Liquidity ratios have remained constant from 2002 at .35; however the 
ratios still indicate that the company has insufficient assets to pay current 
liabilities should they become due. This is readily confirmed when one 
examines and realizes that from 2003 onwards current liabilities have 
increased at a significantly higher rate than current assets.  
• Gearing ratios: Currently more than 100% of the company is financed by 
debt as is evident from a total debt/net worth standing of over 125%. On 
average, over the past 5 years (2000-2004) 41% of the company profits are 
used to pay interest on long-term debt.  
3.3.4 Star Cruises Group Ltd 
There has been no significant increase in sales from 2002 and the company 
incurred losses in every year thereafter. This dismal performance, as explained 
by Wild (2006, p. 102), could have been the result of the high costs associated 
with  setting up NCL America and several unforeseen accidents, particularly the boiler 
explosion that closed Norway’s long career and the flooding incident that delayed the 
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debut of the Pride of America. Wild (2006) felt that this situation was further 
compounded by SARS which had a disruptive effect on the growth of the South-East 
Asian operation. 
• The computed profitability ratios have shown negative profitability in every 
year except 2002. Earnings per share ratio were also negative. 
• Liquidity ratios have remained generally constant except in 2003; however, 
the ratios still indicate that the company has insufficient assets to pay current 
liabilities should they become due. 
• Gearing ratios: The Star Group is heavily financed by debt. In 2004 more 
than 100% of the company was financed by debt and 89% of the company 
profits were used to pay interest on long-term debt. 
3.4 Cruise Associations 9 
 
The two main cruise organizations that represent the interests of cruise operators in 
the North American/Caribbean cruise market are the Florida Caribbean Cruise 
Association (FCCA) and Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). Collectively 
they share resources to undertake marketing research, develop marketing programs, 
and produce publications disseminating their findings. Additionally, they serve as a 
pressure group for their members by lobbying governments and international 
organizations on emerging issues, which impact upon or have the potential to 
adversely affect their members.  Though these associations may appear to be and 
act like conferences, they, however, do not collaborate in the setting of prices nor 
transportation prices (WTO, 2003, pp. 55-56). 
3.4.1 Florida Caribbean Cruise Association (FCCA) 
The FCCA is a not-for-profit trade organization composed of 11 cruise brands that 
operate more than 100 ships in the North American/Caribbean market.  Inaugurated 
in 1972, its main objective is to provide a forum whereby its members can discuss 
issues such as legislation, tourism development, ports, safety, and security 
concerns of the cruise industry.  By sharing its understanding of the cruise industry 
with port authorities, governments, and private/public sector organisations in the 
Caribbean, the FCCA thereby to create partnerships and cooperation with its 
                                                 
9 Based on WTO, 2003, p.55-56, Gibson, 2006, p.40-41, FCCA and CLIA websites 
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stakeholders.  In 1992, it commissioned its first study to analyse the economic 
impact of cruise tourism on destination ports with specific reference to the monetary 
impact of cruise lines, their passengers and crew. Having established closer ties 
with the region after 9/11 the FCCA partnered with 19 destination ports and 
engaged BREA to commission a similar study in 2006 (www.f-cca.com; 
http://www.cruising.org). 
3.4.2  Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) 
 
CLIA was established in 1975 and joined with the International Council of Cruise 
Lines (ICCL) in 2001, to form the Cruise Line Coalition and become the information 
source for the cruise industry. CLIA in 2006 eventually merged with the ICCL to 
become the world’s largest cruise association with a membership, which includes 24 
of the main cruise lines operating in North America. Prior to the merger CLIA was 
mainly concerned with marketing and promoting the benefits of cruising on behalf of 
its 24 member cruise lines and 19000 travel agencies. The member lines controlled 
95.1% of the market and owned 81.2% of the ships whilst the agencies represented 
66% of all agencies in the United States.  
 
The 2006 merger between CLIA and ICCL implicitly meant that in addition to its 
commitment to the promotion and growth of the cruise industry, CLIA now had to 
deal with issues, such as security, vessel and passenger safety, health, insurance, 
environmental degradation and conservation, consumer/passenger protection, as 
well as being a lobbyist on behalf of its membership (WTO, 2003, p. 56). 
3.5 Vessel Classification10 
 
Cruise vessels are categorised according to their size, quality of service offered, 
exquisiteness of cuisine, customer to space ratio, destination focus, carrying 
capacity, and the range of amenities on board.  CLIA (as cited in Gibson, 2006, pp. 
30-31) identified five categories, which are used for the classification of vessels: 
Luxury, Premium, Resort or Contemporary, Niche or Speciality, and Value or 
Traditional. These categories will be used in conjunction with Table 4, to further 
                                                 
10 Based on analysis of CLIA classification by Gibson 2006, p.31 and from own observations as a 
pilot employed with the St. Lucia Air & Sea Ports Authority from 1989 to 2006. 
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explain the classification of vessels belonging to major cruise operators in the North 
American Market. 
 
          Table 4: Defining vessel types 
Definition Description 
Mega-liner over 2,000 passengers 
Super-liner between 1,000 and 2,000 passengers 
Midsize between 400 and 1,000 passengers 
Small less than 400 passengers 
Boutique special purpose, usually less than 300 passengers 
Sailing Vessel a ship primarily powered by wind 
River Barge a ship primarily cruising on inland rivers 
           Source: Gibson, P. 2006, Cruise Operations Management, p.30 
 
Luxury brands are ships that are often small in size with a few being in the midsize 
category. They have the largest passenger to space ratio, and offer the ultimate in 
comfort, cuisine and attentive services. On such vessels, passengers develop 
intimate relationships with Captain and crew because of the vessels’ small size and 
the relatively small number of passengers onboard. Crystal Cruises and Radisson 
were considered market leaders in the luxury segment with shares of 38.6% and 
33.4% respectively of that segment (Mathisen, 2005). Whilst Carnival Corporation 
had the lowest shares (8.8%) in this market they were clearly the market leaders in 
the Luxury Sailing Vessels segment with an impressive 57.4% market share. 
 
Premium brands mainly consist of super liners with a few mega liners. Like luxury 
lines, they offer excellent amenities, spacious and comfortable accommodation 
areas, outside cabins with balconies as well as fine dining opportunities. The 
vessels are bigger than those of the luxury brands and services are lower priced.  
RCCL dominated this segment with a market share of 52.7% followed by Carnival 
Corporation with 42.5% and MSC Cruises and Oceania having a combined share of 
4.8% (Mathisen, 2005) .  
 
Contemporary brands can be compared to floating resorts and mainly consist of 
mega liners with a few super liners.  Their vast size makes it possible for a range of 
amenities to be provided and often such a brand is regarded as a destination in itself.  
Gibson (2006, p.70) claims that some passengers, whilst at a destination port, prefer 
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to stay on board and enjoy the amenities rather than go on shore excursions.  
Carnival Corporation is the market leader in this segment with a market share of 
56.6% trailed by RCCL with 24.4% and the Star Group with 14.9% market shares 
(Mathisen, 2005). 
 
Niche brands comprise vessels ranging from midsize to mega-liners. Unlike the 
other brands and in particular the contemporary brand, the niche brand focuses on 
the destination using their expertise in cultural interpretation, and shore enrichment 
activities to develop a unique product. This market was controlled by Carnival’s 
Cunard Line with market a share of 56.1%, Delta Queen with 27.9%, and Orient 
Lines with16% (Mathisen, 2005). 
 
Lastly, the Value or Budget brand is the most economical of all brands and generally 
comprise of midsize, refurbished, and older ships.  Normally the customer to space 
and staff to passenger ratios as well as the onboard amenities are significantly less 
than those of previously mentioned brands. This market is predominantly controlled 
by Imperial Majesty with a 91.3% market share (Mathisen, 2005). Other operators 
include Windjammer Barefoot Cruises and Star Clippers. 
3.6 Chapter Analysis 
 
The most significant findings of this chapter are the level of market concentration, 
the preferred method of growth, maintenance of brands after acquisition, and the 
financial performance of cruise operators. 
 
The high level of concentration is indicative of an industry nearing maturity. 
According to Hill & Jones  (1998, pp. 94-95) a mature industry is characterized by 
little growth, which leads to intense rivalry for market shares and a drive to build 
brand loyalty. Although this is true, caution must be exercised and due regard given 
to the differences between the Caribbean and the global cruise industry.  Growth in 
the Caribbean for the past years has been marginal, whereas Europe and the 
Mediterranean have experienced healthy growth rates. The Mediterranean (WTO, 
2003) has been able to achieve fully autonomous development with minimum 
reliance on the US and Canadian markets.   
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 Cruise operators, particularly Carnival Corporation, have displayed high levels of 
managerial expertise in the growth strategy used to enter new market segments. As 
previously mentioned, mergers and acquisitions have predominantly been used in 
that regard and as explained by Hill & Jones (1998, pp. 326-327)  the following are 
the benefits to be derived: 
• Relatively short period to establish a market presence when compared to 
organic growth, which generally takes a longer time; 
• Less risky because of reduced uncertainty resulting from prior knowledge 
of the history, financial performance, market share and cash flows of the 
target company; and 
• Less costly, especially if a company is seeking to enter a market where 
existing companies have a noticeable market presence with strong brand 
loyalty. A company may have such considerable brand loyalty that when 
acquired, its name an ambience may not be changed (Cartwright & Baird, 
1999).  
 
In terms of financial performance, Carnival Corporation can be considered the most 
efficient or stable cruise operator, when compared to RCCL and the Star Group.  
The reasons are as follows: increasing profitability (sales and net profits) from year 
to year; return on assets and investment ratios increased in 2004 and 2005, 
returning to 2000 levels; increased capacity resulting from the merger with P&O 
Princess (6 brands with a total of 36,535 lower berths were added to its own 76,789 
to give a total capacity of 113,332 lower berths11); highest profitability ratios; lowest 
debt geared of the three-meaning that it was the least likely to go bankrupt; lowest 
percentage of profits used to pay debt; and the ability to provide, on average, higher 
earnings per share (EPS) than its competitors. 
 
Mention must be made of the astounding recovery made by the Star Group when 
they turned a 2003 operating loss of 20.5 million to an operating profit of 120 million 
in 2004 (G. P. Wild Limited, 2006). 
                                                 
11 In that same year, 2003, RCCL and the Star Group had 59,678 and 24,354 lower berths respectively 
(G. P. Wild Limited, 2006).    
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4 Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
4.1 Economic Impact12  
 
During the cruise year 2005-2006, a total of 15.9 million passengers and crew of 6.6 
million were onboard cruise vessels calling at the 19 destinations listed in Appendix 
B.  As indicated in Table 5, a total of 13.7 million passengers and crew of 2.6 million 
went ashore in destination ports whilst the others remained onboard, either to enjoy 
ship amenities or for work related purposes. 
 
  Table 5: Total Economic Impact by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year 
Destinations 
Passengers 
Onshore 
Visits        
(Thousands) 
Crew 
Onshore 
Visits        
(Thousands) 
Total 
Passengers 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Total Crew 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Cruise line 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Total 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Bahamas 1,585.5 279.8 96.0 5.6 42.8 144.4 
Western 
Caribbean 5,454.3 985.0 442.2 47.1 97.4 586.7 
Eastern 
Caribbean 4,607.6 943.6 630.9 119.9 74.9 825.7 
Southern 
Caribbean 1,018.5 213.3 86.6 11.8 11.5 109.9 
Deep 
Caribbean 1,011.0 186.9 84.6 10.1 10.3 105.0 
Totals 13,676.9 2,608.6 $1,340.3 $194.5 $236.9 $1,771.7 
Source: Own compilation based on information contained in  
http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
 
Table 5 indicates that the 16.3 million passengers and crew who went ashore in the 
Bahamas and other Caribbean locations spent an estimated US$1.5 billion on 
goods and services. Cruise lines spent an additional US$237 million on port 
services such as pilotage, towage, linesmen, water, environmental levies, waste 
disposal and other local goods and services. In home ports and some selected 
                                                 
12 The majority of this section is based on an economic impact study carried out by Business Research 
& Economic Advisors http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
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destination ports where provisioning is done, additional charges were incurred when 
port operational services were used to load food, hotel supplies and other stores to 
cruise vessels. The combined expenditures of passengers, crew and cruise lines 
amounted to US$1.77 billion for cruise the year 2005-2006. 
 
The Eastern Caribbean had the highest cruise tourism expenditures with a total of 
US$826 million, followed by the Western Caribbean with US$587 million, the 
Bahamas with US$144 million, the Southern Caribbean with US$110 million, and 
the Deep Caribbean with US$105 million. The combined figure for the Eastern and 
Western Caribbean represented approximately 80 percent of the total cruise tourism 
expenditure 2005-2006. 
 
Of the 13.7 million passengers who went ashore, revenues of US$1.3 billion were 
generated from expenditures on shore excursions, duty free purchases of clothing 
and jewellery, and handicraft and other souvenirs. Crew on passenger vessels are 
generally not catered for in cruise destinations, but as indicated in Table 5, an 
overall amount of US$194 million was generated by the 2.6 million crew members 
who went ashore.  
 
The Eastern Caribbean, with total crew expenditures of US$120 million represented 
62 % of the total crew expenditure. A possible explanation for this high figure is the 
high level of duty free shopping in St. Maarten and the US Virgin Islands. 
 
Table 6: Direct and Indirect Economic Impacts by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year 
Destinations 
Total 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Direct 
Employment 
Indirect 
Employment 
Direct 
Employee 
Wage Income   
($US Millions) 
Indirect 
Employee 
Wage Income   
($US Millions) 
Bahamas 144.4 2,235 1,730 34.3 26.6 
Western Caribbean 586.7 8,890 5,675 100.0 73.8 
Eastern Caribbean 825.7 9,805 7,235 172.1 130.1 
Southern 
Caribbean 109.9 1,960 1,215 16.6 10.7 
Deep Caribbean 105.0 1,650 1,105 21.1 14.9 
Totals $1,771.7 24,540.0 16,960.0 $344.1 $256.1 
Source: Own compilation based on information contained in 
 http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
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The US$1.77 billion in cruise tourism revenues generated in the cruise year 2005-
2006 and shown in Table 6 resulted in direct employment for 24,540 Caribbean 
nationals with businesses providing goods and services to passengers, crew and 
cruise vessels. The wages earned by these employees totalled US$344 million. 
Overall, when considering the total revenue of US$1.77 billion and direct 
employment of 24, 540 persons, it can be reasoned that for every US$72,12713 
generated from cruise tourism, one Caribbean national was employed.   
 
Alternatively, indirect employment of 16,960 jobs generated wages of US$256.1 
million. Using the same methodology employed above, it can safely be concluded 
that for every US$104,363 cruise generated revenue a positive economic impact 
was produced by the resulting job that was created.  
4.1.1 Direct Impact  
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Figure 8: Direct Employment Impact of Cruise Tourism by Destination, 2005-2006 Cruise Year 
Source: http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
 
In Table 6, the Eastern Caribbean had the highest cruise tourism expenditure with 
US$826 million followed by the Western Caribbean with US$587 million. The region 
with the lowest passenger expenditure was the Deep Caribbean revenues of 
US$105 million and direct employment of 1650 jobs.  
 
An examination of Figure 8 shows that San Juan (9.6%), St. Maarten (13%), and the 
US Virgin Islands (14%) made up 36% of the total direct employment created from 
                                                 
13 US$1.77 billion /24,540 jobs = US$72,127. 
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the US$1.77 billion cruise tourism expenditure. In the Eastern Caribbean segment, 
the three destinations represented 91% of total employment figure of 9805 jobs for 
that segment.  The other two destinations represented in the Eastern Caribbean 
segment are Antigua, and St. Kitts & Nevis with job creation levels of 3% and 1% 
respectively.  The great disparity within that segment can probably be explained by 
the dual status of San Juan as a home and destination port, the orientation of St. 
Maarten and the US Virgin Islands towards duty free shopping.  ECLAC (2005) 
implicitly states that the US Virgin Islands will enjoy the highest cruise tourism 
expenditures because their duty free exemptions are higher than that of other 
Caribbean islands. 
 
Cozumel has a very impressive direct employment figure of 3,715 which is 2.9% 
greater than the combined number of jobs in the Southern Caribbean and Deep 
Caribbean. Destinations in the Southern Caribbean include Barbados with 950 jobs, 
Dominica with 255, Martinique with 70 and St. Lucia with an overall number of 685 
created jobs. Likewise, a breakdown of the Deep Caribbean includes Aruba with 985, 
Cartagena14 with 95, Curacao with 250, and Grenada with a total of 320 jobs arising 
from cruise tourism expenditure of US$16.3 million.  
 
The Bahamas, with its cruise ports of Nassau and Freeport ranks 6th with cruise 
revenues of US$144.4 million but 4th in terms of direct employment creation. The 
dominant position enjoyed by the Eastern and Western Caribbean segments, and 
Bahamas should be expected since in Figure 5, they had relatively high market 
shares of 36%, 30% and 18% respectively. 
4.1.2 Indirect Impact  
 
Figure 9, which show the indirect impact of cruise tourism by destination mirrors 
Figure 8 in many respects. Destinations such as US Virgin Islands, St. Maarten and 
Puerto Rico in the Eastern Caribbean, the Bahamas, and Cozumel and Cayman 
Islands in the Western Caribbean segments fared much better than their counter-
parts in the Southern and Deep Caribbean. 42% of the destinations in Figure 9 
                                                 
14 Cartagena is really in South America but for this exercise is treated as part of the Deep Caribbean. 
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experienced low indirect impacts and had less than 500 jobs created whilst 15.7% 
had above 2000 jobs generated indirectly by cruise tourism. The destinations, in 
order of rank, with the highest number of indirect jobs in Figure 8 are Cozumel, US 
Virgin Islands, and St. Maarten. In Figure 9, though they still share the top three 
spots the ranking this time has changed with US Virgin Islands attaining the highest 
rank followed by St. Maarten and then Cozumel. 
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    Figure 9: Indirect Impact of Cruise Tourism by Destination, 2005-2006 Cruise year 
    Source: http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf
 
4.2 Environmental Impact  
 
The environmental impact of cruise tourism on destination ports, adverse or 
otherwise, is caused by complex relationships among the various stakeholders. 
Such stakeholders include but are not limited to Cruise Operators, Flag States, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Destination Ports. The latter includes 
governments, port authorities, tour operators, attraction administrators, agents and, 
to a lesser extent, the inhabitants themselves.  
 
Cruise vessels are central to any analysis on environmental impact studies related 
to cruise tourism. These vessels, in addition to being the link between Home and 
Destination Ports, are designed, built, and marketed as floating hotels. The many 
amenities onboard these vessels which assist in achieving this strategy generate 
waste, which, in some instances, has been indiscriminately dumped along the sea 
routes plied by these vessels (OCEANA, "n.d."). 
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Johnson (2002, p. 263) uses the life-cycle analysis (LCA)15 to categorise the impact 
cruise tourism has on the environment. The five categories used in the LCA 
methodology are infrastructural, operational, distribution, use, and waste impacts. 
They are analysed as follows: 
• Infrastructural impacts begin with the construction of the vessel and 
continue with the modifications to the natural habitats to build berths and 
cruise terminals.  
• Operational impacts pertain to the vessel and the effect it has on the 
ocean and air quality. Such impacts are caused by antifouling paints, 
damage caused to coral reefs by anchoring operations and the emission of 
exhausts and ozone depleting substances by ship engines. 
• Distribution impacts are those associated with tourist travel and the 
logistics of provisioning a cruise liner. It also involves going over the 
carrying capacity of destinations and any congestion or pollution caused by 
landside transport links. 
• Use impacts are those related to social, cultural, health, and economic 
activities as well as the impacts of recreational activities on wild life. 
• Waste impacts refer to ship generated wastes such as oils, garbage, 
sewage, plastics and other hazardous substances which require port 
reception facilities for ship to shore disposal.  Gray water (waste water) 
from sinks, showers, galleys and laundry contains significant contaminants 
and should also be included in this section.  
4.2.1 Air pollution  
 
Cruise vessels use fuel not only to power their engines but also to maintain the 
integrated electrical systems used to create that “wow” effect onboard 
(www.oceana.org). That very fuel however, when emitted as exhaust into the 
atmosphere can and does impact negatively on human beings as well as the 
stratosphere.  
 
                                                 
15 LCA was developed by British Airways to categorise the impact of tourism on the Seychelles. 
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The exhausts from diesel engines comprise many gases, the most significant of 
which are nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur oxides (SOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2).  
NOx and SOx emissions have high environmental impacts and are known for causing 
acid rain, over-fertilization of lakes and soil, and potential damage to vegetation and 
human health. SOx emissions are negligible at sea but more pronounced near 
coastlines and especially in cruise ports, which are normally located near major 
residential areas. Lastly, CO2, which is a natural constituent of the air, is considered 
a major greenhouse gas, which contributes to global warming (Hellén, 2003). 
 
Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78, effectively sets limits on sulphur oxide and nitrogen 
oxide emissions from ship exhausts and prohibits deliberate emissions of ozone 
depleting substances. It must be noted that irrespective of this, the Caribbean has 
not been designated as a SOx Emission Control Area (SECA) and does not have the 
capacity to monitor nor determine, the extent of environmental damage caused by 
cruise vessels (International Maritime Organization, 1997) . 
 
It is very difficult, therefore, to allocate any monetary costs to the toxic emissions 
from cruise ships. However, according to the Bluewater Network (2006), shipping 
emissions contribute to substantial human health and environmental problems. 
People living near ports experience higher levels of cancer, heart attacks, asthma, 
respiratory illness and other cardiopulmonary problems as well as premature death.  
  
This type of pollution, considered an operational impact, has not gone unnoticed. 
Research is currently being done to determine the most cost-effective option aimed 
at reducing the level of harmful emissions from ship engines. The International 
Maritime Organization along with other stakeholders such as International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), and the International 
Bunker Industry Association (IBIA) are in the forefront of this research. Available 
options include the burning of distillate fuel, installation of scrubbers, and using low 
sulphur heavy fuels (Cruise Industry News, 2007). 
 
In the interim, the Caribbean should be hoping that the intensive lobbying efforts by 
environmental groups allied with Friends of the Earth International (Bluewater 
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Network, 2006) will succeed in getting the IMO to introduce air pollution controls on 
both new and existing engines to assist in drastically reducing air pollution from 
diesel ship engines. 
4.2.2 Ship generated wastes  
Ship generated wastes, especially the magnitude generated by cruise vessels, have 
led the IMO to designate the Wider Caribbean as a “special area” under Annex V: 
Garbage of MARPOL 73/78. The Caribbean is thus afforded higher levels of 
protection than other areas of the sea due to technical reasons relating to its 
oceanographic and ecological conditions as well as its heavy reliance on cruise 
tourism. Annex V goes further to put the obligation on governments who have 
ratified this regulation, to ensure that adequate port reception facilities 16  are 
available for garbage reception (International Maritime Organization, 1991). 
 
The Caribbean is the world’s top cruise destination and one where the majority of 
very large cruise vessels (VLCVs) have been deployed. This should be a cause of 
environmental concern when considering the waste generation capacity of such 
vessels, the tarnished history of cruise lines for deliberately polluting, and the lack of 
adequate port reception facilities in destination ports. A cruise ship with a carrying 
capacity of 2,000-3,000 passengers (OCEANA, "n.d.") can potentially generate 
waste per passenger per day of approximately 300 litres of greywater, 40 litres of 
blackwater, 10 litres of bilge water, 3.5 kilos of garbage and 30 grams of toxic waste. 
 
  Table 7: Amount of waste generated in the Bahamas and Caribbean for the year 2004 
Segments Passengers 
(000’s) 
Grey 
water 
(litres) 
Black 
water 
(litres) 
Bilge 
water 
(litres) 
Garbage 
(kilos)  
Toxic 
Residue 
(grams) 
Bahamas 2767 830100 110680 27670 9685 83010 
Western 
Caribbean 6323 1896900 252920 63230 22131 189690 
Eastern 
Caribbean 6826 2047800 273040 68260 23891 204780 
Southern 
Caribbean 5131 1539300 205240 51310 17959 153930 
Deep Caribbean 1751 525300 70040 17510 6129 52530 
Total 22798 6839400 911920 227980 79793 683940 
Source: Own compilation of data, selection of base year and segments based on concept depicted in  
http://www.oceana.org/fileadmin/oceana/uploads/europe/reports/cruise_ships_eng.pdf p.1
                                                 
16 Port reception facilities will be discussed thoroughly in Section 4.2.3 
 35 
 
Taking the calculated waste per passenger per day, Table 7 shows the amount of 
waste that was generated in 2004 in the combined geographic segments of the 
Bahamas and the Caribbean. The scope of this dissertation does not allow for a 
thorough analysis of methods used by cruise vessels, to dispose of waste that is not 
incinerated or treated onboard as well as waste which cannot be disposed of in 
Caribbean ports.  Surely, if wastes are dumped at sea then the magnitude of 
externalities arising from this environmental degradation would far outweigh any 
benefits derived.  
 
In the past, especially in the United States, cruise lines have been prosecuted and 
heavily fined for their deliberate circumvention of MARPOL 73/78. For example, 87 
confirmed cases were prosecuted in the United States and fines in excess of $US 
30 million were levied against cruise lines during 1993 to 1998. As recently as 2002, 
fines of $US18 million and US$1.5 million were levied at Carnival Corporation and 
Norwegian Cruise Line respectively for illegally dumping wastes in US waters 
( ECLAC, 2005; Schmidt, 2000). 
 
Today, unlike in the past, the major cruise operators have demonstrated more 
cognizance of the potential impact the industry has on the environment. The turn 
around began in 2003 when RCCL, the very first in the industry, attained the 
internationally accredited environmental management certificate of ISO 14001. 
Having substantially invested in its own fleet, market leader Carnival Corporation & 
plc followed suit and attained ISO 14001 certification on September 12, 2006. 
According to its chairman and CEO Micky Arison, “Carnival Corporation & plc will 
continue to undertake wide ranging environmental initiatives in an effort to reduce its 
environmental footprint” (Cruise Industry News, 2006; Peisley, 2006). 
 
This view is echoed by Gibson (2006) who seems to suggest, that cruise ships now 
treat ship generated wastes in accordance to industry regulatory requirements which 
are often more stringent and demanding than government regulations. 
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4.2.3 Port reception facilities  
 
As per Regulation 12 (1) of Annex I: Oil, Regulation 10 (1) of Annex IV: Sewage and 
Regulation 7 (1) of Annex V: Garbage of MARPOL 73/78, parties to the Convention 
should ensure that reception facilities are available at their ports and terminals for 
ship generated wastes.  The operation of such facilities should not cause undue 
delays to ships and should have the capacity to meet the requirements of the ships 
using them (IMO, 2002). The Convention designating the Wider Caribbean region as 
a Special Area, was adopted on 4 July 1991, came into force on 4 April 1993, but to 
date has not taken effect. According to Francesco J.L Inglés17, the Convention only 
takes effect when Caribbean nations indicate to the IMO that they are equipped with  
reception facilities as per the above cited regulations (F.J.L. Ingles, personal 
communication, August 3, 2007;International Maritime Organization, 1991).  
 
The Saint Lucia Solid Waste Management Authority (SLSWMA) agrees that many 
regional states do not have IMO approved “reception facilities” and alluded to the 
cost factor as a possible reason for their unavailability.  SLSWMA, however, 
explained that many CARICOM states work closely with cruise lines to facilitate the 
reception and disposal of certain categories of ship generated wastes. Saint Lucia 
for example, through the collaborative efforts of the Saint Lucia Solid Waste 
Management Authority and local businesses, is able to receive and dispose of 
plastics, solid wastes, biomedical wastes and oil/oily wastes. Cruise lines, through 
their agents, are required to give 48 hours prior notice of their intentions to dispose 
of such waste (SLSWMA, Personal communication, July 03, 2007).   
4.3 Social Impact  
 
Socially, cruise tourism has had both positive and negative influences on the 
Caribbean. Proponents of its positive impact see cruise tourism as an engine which 
generates renewed awareness and celebration of indigenous Caribbean cultures 
and historic sites. This is of particular importance to the region, especially since with 
the passage of time, cultural values and the historical significance of various sites 
                                                 
17 Francesco J.L Inglés is the Head of the Oil Pollution Prevention & Implementation Section of IMO 
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and monuments are not readily transmitted from one generation to the next (King, 
LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000).  
 
Alternatively, critics view cruise tourism as being responsible for rekindling 
memories of the slave/master relationship and thus leading to the relegation of black 
people. They also argue that treating the region’s culture, land and people as a 
commodity to foreigners must definitely have a strong impact on the way that 
nationals view themselves and their culture (King, LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000).   
 
Nurez, (as cited in Cartwright & Baird, 1999), defines acculturation as a process 
whereby groups borrow aspects of culture from each other. He sees it as a very 
one-sided process because of the short time cruise vessels spend in destination 
ports.  As a result, it may be difficult for an individual American or British passenger 
to internalise the culture of a destination, but relatively easy for its inhabitants to 
acquire aspects of their social and cultural attributes.  This, Nurez argues, was 
possible because inhabitants of destination ports would be exposed to thousands of 
American and British nationals during the cruise season. He identified linguistic 
aspects as being the easiest to adopt and incorporate into the day-to-day lives of the 
Caribbean inhabitants. 
 
Dermot Saltibus, Ex-Director of Maritime Affairs of the Saint Lucia Air & Sea Ports 
Authority, sees the social problem of drug smuggling as being a potential risk 
associated with cruise tourism. In most instances, passengers leave the vessel and 
proceed directly to excursion buses, dive boats, catamarans and other pleasure 
craft without having to go through customs and security checks.  On cruise vessels, 
security checks are executed when passengers or shore personnel are embarking 
and not during disembarkation (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).  
4.4 Security Issues18  
 
The Caribbean, the world’s number one cruise destination, is literally located in the 
“back yard” of the United States and often referred to as its “third border”. The 
region is heavily dependent on cruise tourism and in accordance with the US 
                                                 
18Based on findings of United States Government Accountability Office and IMO website  
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Government Accountability Office (2007), an estimated 68 percent of cruise 
passengers in the Caribbean in 2006 were from North America. The North American 
source market can thus be regarded as the backbone of the Caribbean’s cruise 
industry. 
 
The most significant security initiative to ever emerge in the region and which has 
had lasting impacts on all ports is the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS).  It was developed by the IMO in response to perceived threats to ships 
and port facilities following the terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001. The Code’s approach of ensuring the security of ships and port facilities was 
practically one of risk assessment and management.  The most effective method 
recommended to assess risk was to treat each perceived threat on the basis of its 
own merit and then determine the most appropriate security measures to employ 
http://www.imo.org. 
 
The ISPS Code, therefore, called on Contracting Governments to make every effort 
to enhance the level of security at their port facilities, especially since the events of 
9/11 implicitly signified that acts of terrorism were real and not imaginary.  Port 
facilities were thus required to develop security plans, increase the complement of 
security officers, and more extensive use of security equipment.  This would allow 
port facilities to have better control over port access and improved monitoring of the 
activities of people, cargo, and the movement of marine craft (Moth, 2003).  
 
The costs incurred by regional states to be ISPS compliant were considerable taking 
into account the tranquil environment and generally lax security at most ports. A 
considerable amount of borrowing had to be undertaken by regional states to 
upgrade their security levels and be cleared for compliance by the stipulated date of 
July 1, 2004. According to port officials at the Barbados Port Incorporation, the 
introduction of new security measures entailed spending vast sums of money. They, 
however, saw the high compliance costs as being necessary to maintain the 
region’s accolade of being one of the safest destinations worldwide (Faria, 2005). 
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This view of the Caribbean being a “safe zone” is substantiated in a recent report 
released by the US Government Accountability Office (2007) on Port Security in the 
Caribbean. The Agency stated that US intelligence sources found no specific, 
credible terrorist threats to maritime security in the Caribbean Basin.  
4.5 Liner Shipping Impact  
 
Cruise tourism in the Caribbean, as has been repeatedly said, is a huge business. 
All destination ports, particularly those which rely heavily on this industry, give 
priority berthing to cruise vessels. In small ports with a combination of dedicated 
cruise terminals19 and multi-user berths, this practice is more pronounced. On a 
typical day during the cruise season, where all berths have been assigned to cruise 
vessels, it is customary for container vessels to spend as much as thirteen hours at 
the anchorage.  The monetary costs, associated with such lengthy delays to liner 
shipping companies, shippers and their customers, are hardly ever considered by 
port authorities.  
 
Saltibus believes that port operators should examine the impact of their berthing 
policies on the general economy. In instances where berthing conflicts exist, then 
ports should seek alternative means of accommodation and use anchorages rather 
than compromise the movement of general cargoes.  Saltibus, fervently argued, that 
the some port operators were insensitive to the added cost incurred by shipping 
companies arising from the berthing priority given to cruise vessels (D. Saltibus, 
personal communication, July 15, 2007).  
 
Fritz Pinnock, Executive Director of the Jamaica Maritime Institute, and Pilots 
Lazarus Joseph and Gary Benjamin from the Grenada and Dominica Port 
Authorities, all agree that priority berthing given to cruise vessels can adversely 
impact on the operations of container vessels. However, Pinnock, Joseph and 
Benjamin all shared the view that since ports operated on a 24-hour basis, container 
vessels had the opportunity to work at nights and lessen the impacts related to 
waiting time.  Additionally, Pilot Joseph indicated that notwithstanding this adversity, 
                                                 
19 This refers to berths dedicated for cruise vessels in general and not for any particular cruise line. 
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with adequate communication between the port and shipping agents, container 
vessels could always adjust their arrival times to arrive “just in time” and thus avoid 
undue delays and costs (F. Pinnock, personal communications, July 12-18, 2007). 
 
Wood (as cited in Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt, 2006) held the view, that it was almost a 
universal practice to give berthing priority to cruise vessels. He implied that cruise 
vessels had a domineering attitude, hated to wait in line, and at the slightest sign of 
delay, would threaten to cancel the call. Woods felt that this practice was detrimental 
to cargo vessels and generally, unjustified economically.  
4.6 Chapter Analysis  
 
The cruise industry appears to be contributing quite significantly to destination ports 
as was depicted in Tables 5 & 6, and in Figures 8 & 9. Revenues generated from 
the cruise industry were obtained not only from cruise passengers but also from 
various vessels and members of the crew. However, taking into account the 
changing demography of cruisers, the lower costs of cruising brought about by 
economies of scale, and the tendency to market the vessel as the prime destination, 
one wonders just how significant are the much proclaimed benefits.  
 
      Table 8: Comparison of economic benefits of selected destinations for cruise year 2005-2006 
Destinations 
Total 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Direct 
Employment 
% of 
Population 
Total 
Employment 
% of 
Population Population 
Bahamas 144.4 2,235 0.7% 3,965  1.3% 303,770 
Belize 64.2 1,215 0.4% 1,885 0.6% 300,000 
Cayman Is. 179.7 2,090 8.8% 3,705 15.6% 23,800 
St. Maarten 246.4 3,210 5.2% 5,590 9.0% 61,967 
US Virgin Is. 361.6 3,525 3.5% 6,165 6.1% 101,809 
Barbados 57.3 950 0.4% 1,635 0.6% 257,083 
St. Lucia 34.8 685 0.4% 1,035 0.7% 152,335 
Aruba 66.2 985 1.5% 1,710 2.6% 65,100 
Curacao 18.0 250 0.2% 420 0.3% 143,816 
     Source: Own compilation based on data found in www.ipoaa.com/caribbean_population.htm &                                       
      http://www.f-cca.com/downloads/2006-Caribbean-Cruise-Analysis.pdf   
 
Table 8, which compares cruise tourism expenditures for selected destinations to 
the jobs created as a percentage of the population, clearly shows that directly or 
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otherwise, the benefits were marginal. The only destinations in Table 8, benefiting 
slightly better than others, but marginal nevertheless, are the Cayman Islands, Sint 
Maarten, and the US Virgin Islands. Coincidentally, these destinations all have 
overseas territory status and belong to Britain, Holland and the United States 
respectively.  Further research may be needed to determine if any correlation exists 
when the status of a destination is compared to its cruise tourism revenues, level of 
jobs created and island-related attributes, especially those attributes which serve as 
a stimulant for investment. 
 
Any business venture related to the cruise tourism industry will more than likely have 
environmental impacts as described in the life cycle analysis previously discussed in 
Section 4.2-Environmental Impact. The magnitude of impacts can, however, be 
lessened if proactive action is taken by all stakeholders and if operations are 
consistently monitored.  For example, the Port of Le Havre, during the construction 
phase of its Project 2000, spent a substantial amount to restore mud flats, build a 
sanctuary for birds, and create an ecological beach. Arrangements were also made 
to undertake scientific follow up studies for about 10 years after the construction of 
Port 2000 (Port of Le Havre Authority, 2007). 
 
The Caribbean, in comparison, hardly undertakes any environmental impact studies 
for port infrastructural development or for the creation of tourist attractions. Fritz 
Pinnock and Dermot Saltibus agree, that the high cost of cruise ship environmental 
impact studies is one reason why few regional states monitor the impact of cruise 
tourism on regional states.  They also generally agreed that the environmental levy 
was not always used for environmental purposes and in most instances was placed 
in governments’ consolidated fund (F. Pinnock; D. Saltibus, personal communication, 
July 14-15, 2007). 
 
Knowing this, as well as the historical evidence of cruise vessels at times 
intentionally circumventing MARPOL 73/78, one can only wonder on the extent of 
dumping which has been done in the Caribbean. This is particularly frightening, 
given the scale of wastes generated by vessels operating in the region during 2004 
(see Table 7) and the many health problems, even deaths that may have occurred. 
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Both Pinnock and Saltibus, expressed the view, that the absence of a regional policy 
to govern the collection, transportation and disposal of ship-generated wastes may 
lead to a situation where the costs of cruise tourism far exceed its benefits. 
  
As an agent of cultural and social change, cruise tourism is extremely influential.  
The Caribbean is known for having a homophobic culture which, strangely enough, 
is more receptive to lesbians than gays. Undertaking detailed research to confirm 
this is not necessary; a simple Google search on “gay bashing in the Caribbean” 
will generate tons of information. For better or for worse, it will never be known, the 
cruise industry has managed by virtue of its economic power, to get some regional 
states to allow vessels with gay cruisers into their ports. The very first time a vessel 
with gay cruisers called at Port Castries in St. Lucia, many taxi drivers withheld their 
services that day as a sign of protest against gays.  
 
The situation on a subsequent visit of that vessel came as a shock. The same 
drivers who vehemently protested months before were now in the forefront of drivers 
who wanted to offer their services. The reason for this apparently sudden change 
was the high economic value attached to gay cruisers by drivers who had no 
reservations in offering their services to that category of cruiser20.    Though this 
may appear minor but for this to happen in a region where it is illegal to marry 
someone of the same sex, it is significant. 
 
This last point brings an end to this chapter because it shows the importance of the 
revenues generated by cruise tourism to people directly involved in the industry.  
Though the number of jobs created may be low, when consideration is given to the 
multiplier effect of every dollar, a greater number of persons gain from the industry 
than what research would otherwise indicate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Apparently, the cruisers had given very attractive tips to their taxi drivers. 
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5 Critical Issues Facing Destination Ports 
 
5.1 Increasing Vessel Size  
 
Table 9 shows the changing size, carrying capacity and cost of selected cruise 
vessels plying the Caribbean during 1987 to 2006. It also reveals the gross tonnage 
of new projects being undertaken by Carnival Cruise Lines and Royal Caribbean 
International. In 1987, the Royal Viking Sun, to some ports, would have been 
considered to be a mega vessel and those ports at that time had facilities to 
adequately accommodate her. The emergence of increasingly larger vessels meant 
that only the smaller vessels could be berthed alongside whilst the new comers 
found accommodation at the anchorage. A system of “tendering” was thus 
introduced whereby small boats and in some cases the cruise vessels’ life boats 
would be used to shuttle passengers from ship to shore and vice versa.   
Table 9: Changing size, carrying capacity and cost of selected cruise vessels, 1987-2009 
Year Name of Vessel Line Passenger Capacity  Crew 
Gross 
Tonnage 
Length   
(in feet) 
Cost       
($US 
Millions) 
1987 Royal Viking Sun Cunard 740 384 37,845 672 NF 
1993 Sensation Carnival 2,056 920 70,367 855 300.0 
1998 Grand Princess Princess 2,600 1,100 109,000 951 400.0 
2003 
Marnier of the 
Seas21 RCI 3,114 1,181 142,000 1,020 550.0 
2003 Queen Mary-2* Cunard 2,640 1,253 150,000 1,132 NF 
2006 
Freedom of the 
Seas RCI 3,634 1,385 158,000 1,112 720.0 
2009 Pinnacle Project Carnival NF NF 200,000  NF 
2009 Project Genesis RCI 5,400.0 NF 220,000 1,180 NF 
NF-No Found;  * Queen Mary 2 visits the Caribbean twice a year on her transatlantic crossing 
Source: Mathisen, O., 2005, p.79-100; http://shipstips.com
 
Eventually, upon realising that the big ship trend was continuing, destination ports 
took the plunge and obtained finance through loans and grants to upgrade their 
                                                 
21 All references made to Voyager of the Seas would have the same specifications as this vessel 
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facilities. Harbours were dredged, berths constructed, passenger terminals built, 
shore attractions enhanced, and most importantly, human resources were trained to 
provide support services.  This era also saw the modification of the tour concept 
whereby it was no longer sufficient to simply “drive around” with tourists and stop at 
prearranged locations for meals; a tour was redefined to incorporate a host of 
activities, some cultural in nature when such stops were made.  
 
Not long after regional states had undergone extensive and expensive upgrades, 
and before they could have even repaid a significant loan amount, the size of cruise 
vessels again was on the increase. An example is given of the Saint Lucia Air & Sea 
Ports Authority investing EC$14.422 million to upgrade the two cruise-only finger 
piers to continuous berths in March 2000.  By July 2002, an additional EC$3.9 
million was spent to modify one of the recently constructed berths. This was 
“supposedly” necessary to facilitate the berthing of Adventure of the Seas in August 
2002.  
 
Throughout the Caribbean, other islands also invested in their berthing and terminal 
facilities so as to be in a state of readiness for mega cruise vessels, if and when 
they do call.  Examples are St. Maarten, St. Kitts, Dominica, Jamaica, Grenada, and 
Antigua (Peisley, 2006).   
 
5.1.1 Capacity to accommodate mega cruise vessels  
Further research to ascertain whether destination ports in the region had the 
capacity to accommodate mega cruise lines revealed the following: 
Bahamas 
A tourism official at the Freeport Harbour Company Limited confirmed that both 
Freeport Harbour and Nassau had eight cruise ship berths. At Freeport the berths 
had a continuous length of 4, 500 feet and Nassau, a total of 4,904 feet. The 
maximum draft was 32 feet. The largest class of vessel, which could be 
accommodated at either of the ports, was that of the Voyager Class with an overall 
length of 1020 feet. According to the unnamed official, there were no immediate 
                                                 
22 US$1.00 is equivalent to EC$2.67 
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plans to upgrade any of the berths (Freeport Harbour Company Limited, personal 
communication, July 24, 2007).  
 
Western Caribbean 
Belize: Anthony Mahler of the Belize Tourist Board admitted that there were no 
berths to accommodate cruise vessels in Belize. As a result, all vessels anchored 
approximately five miles off the coast and tenders were used to shuttle passengers 
ashore. He indicated that there were ongoing discussions between Royal Caribbean 
International (RCI) and a Belizean who owned an island to construct two mega 
cruise vessel berths on his premises. RCI is the co-owner of the Belize Tourism 
Village with global jewellery retailer, Diamonds International. Mahler also alluded to 
a US$50-60 million deal between Carnival Lines and the local owner of a cargo port 
in Belize to construct a cruise port for mega vessels. Apparently, there was a break 
down in talks between the two parties and the local entrepreneur is now seeking 
other partners to pursue the venture (A. Mahler, personal communication, July 23, 
2007). 
 
Cayman Islands: Joseph Wood of the Port Authority of the Cayman Islands 
acknowledged that all cruise vessels were accommodated at the anchorage since 
no physical berths existed. He, however, hinted that talks were in progress to 
construct a facility to simultaneously berth four mega cruise vessels. As implied by 
Peisley (2006), the Cayman Islands had a very high intrinsic value since it 
consistently was in the top three or four Caribbean cruise destinations, despite there 
being no physical berths.  Efforts to obtain an estimated project cost from Wood 
were futile (J. Wood, personal communication, July 23, 2007). 
 
Jamaica: Captain Mendes of the Port Authority of Jamaica gave some insightful 
information about the capacity of Jamaica to berth not only the largest vessel afloat 
today, but also of their preparations to provide a berth alongside for the Genesis in 
2009 (Table 9).  Freedom of the Seas, currently the worlds’ largest cruise vessel, 
can be safely berthed at Ocho Rios and Montego Bay. At present, studies are 
underway to assess the feasibility of converting the vacant port of San Falmouth into 
a cruise terminal. Captain Mendes explained that the nature of the cruise industry 
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was such that, within a few years of undertaking berth upgrades, new and bigger 
vessels were being built. A port, desirous of maintaining its competitiveness, would 
also have to adapt its development to coincide with that of new vessel releases 
(Mendes, personal communication, July 23, 2007).   
 
Eastern Caribbean 
Antigua: Chief Pilot Michael Emmanuel indicated that Heritage Quay could 
accommodate four Voyager Class vessels and the Deep water Harbour two (Table 
9). In accordance with Emmanuel, Heritage Quay had four cruise-only berths and 
Deep Water Harbour had two commercial berths which were also used for cruise 
vessels. The Chief Pilot further revealed that the port, in keeping with the 
requirements of RCCL, was planning to increase the diameter of the turning basin 
by 50 meters to facilitate the safe manoeuvring of the Freedom of the Seas when 
she makes her inaugural call. He was, however, quick to point out that the port was 
nearing its limit with regards to the size of vessel that can be berthed (M. Emmanuel, 
personal communication, July 23, 2007).   
 
St. Maarten: An island known for its attractive duty free shopping facilities can berth 
three Voyager Class vessels alongside and two small vessels (Table 4-defining 
vessel types). Romain Laville, of the St. Maarten Port Authority, explained that 
during the peak of the cruise season, the island would sometimes have visitors from 
6-9 cruise vessels per day. Vessels unable to get a berth would normally anchor a 
few cables off the capital Philipsburg and use tenders to get passengers ashore. In 
that regard, a jetty to berth 12 tenders has recently been constructed. Freedom of 
the Seas according to Romaine, has docked alongside the Dr. A.C. Wathey cruise 
facility and preparations were already being made to berth the Genesis in 2009 
(Romain Laville, personal communication, July 23, 2007). 
 
Southern Caribbean
Barbados: In the past Barbados, in keeping with the views expressed by Pilot 
James Padmore could easily berth 6-7 cruise vessels, but now, with the increasing 
size of vessels, the port’s capacity had reduced to three Voyager Class vessels. 
Padmore was confident that his port could accommodate the Freedom Class 
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vessels having berthed the Queen Mary 2 alongside in recent times (J. Padmore, 
personal communication, July 23, 2007). 
 
Dominica: Pilot Garry Benjamin expressed concern with the ever increasing size of 
cruise vessels, since it meant costly upgrades to existing facilities and perhaps even 
the construction of new ones. The largest vessel to berth at the Cabrits Cruise Ship 
Berth was of the Grand Princess Class in Table 9.  Pilot Benjamin was positive that 
larger vessels could be berthed so long as their draft did not exceed 10 meters. 
Dominica has three cruise ship berths with one of the three having cruise-only status 
(G. Benjamin, personal communication, July 12, 2007).  
 
St. Lucia: Port Castries can accommodate two Voyager Class, one Sensation Class, 
and two Royal Viking Class vessels simultaneously (see Table 9). The port has two 
cruise-only berths, owns a duty-free shopping complex and has plans on 
constructing a crew entertainment facility to tap into crew expenditure as a source of 
cruise related revenue. Port Castries, according to Chief Pilot O. Cadet, has a 
turning basin of 1400 feet and thus sufficient space to manoeuvre and berth 
Freedom Class vessels. He further explained that Berths 3 & 4 were upgraded in 
2006 and high wind bollards were installed to facilitate the safe mooring of that class 
of vessel.  He did indicate that dredging had to be done and talks had been held 
with Captain Neilsen of Royal Caribbean International pertaining to the Freedom of 
the Seas (O. Cadet, personal communication, July 25, 2007). 
 
Deep Caribbean 
Grenada: In the past, all vessels of the Sensation Class (Table 9) and above 
anchored off Capital city St. Georges and shuttled passengers ashore.  However, 
the new EC$33 million Melville Street berthing facility allows vessels of Grand 
Princess Class to berth on either side of the facility. Pilot Lazarus Joseph, Grenada 
Ports Authority, indicated that smaller vessels can be accommodated at the 
commercial port of St. Georges. Joseph, however, had reservations about the 
adequacy of the new facility to facilitate the berthing of increasingly larger vessels 
and the congestion that may result at heritage sites ashore. Queen Mary 2 visited 
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Grenada and berthing space was provided at the anchorage (L. Joseph, personal 
communication, July 18, 2007). 
 
Aruba: Richard Lecla, Aruba Ports Authority, Inc. indicated that the island’s main 
harbour had three cruise ship berths and one multi-user berth. The largest vessel 
the port could accommodate belonged to the Grand Princess Class listed in Table 9.  
Lecla, however, revealed that plans were currently underway to upgrade the port’s 
berthing facility in 2008 to berth Voyager Class vessels (R. Lecla, personal 
communication, July 23, 2007).    
5.2 Balance of Power between Cruise Operators and Regional Ports  
 
The term balance of power in the context of this dissertation refers to the ability of 
one entity to exert control over the actions of another by using its own strategic 
advantages or by exploiting inherent weaknesses of the other entity. It implicitly 
means that the party asked to perform a task will comply irrespective of not being in 
agreement or being placed in a disadvantageous position as a result.  Cruise 
operators in the Caribbean are perceived to have the balance of power in their 
favour and on several occasions have been accused of using that power against 
destination ports. 
 
In assessing the validity of this allegation the following issues will be discussed; 
level of concentration among cruise operators, substitutability of destinations, 
market representation, cooperation among destination ports, and dependence of 
destination ports on cruise tourism.   
5.2.1 Level of concentration 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, cruise operators Carnival Corporation, RCCL 
and the Star Group, have among them shares representing as much as, 90% of the 
North American Market. The largest cruise operators possess among them 
considerable power, which is often used during negotiations with suppliers, 
destination ports and other key industry players. Gibson (2006) asserts that cruise 
operators aim to reduce costs as much as possible without negatively affecting 
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quality. Gibson further explained that negotiation is done to achieve the best ratio of 
price to quality and to benefit from economies of scale and negotiating power. 
 
On several occasions cruise operators have flexed their powerful muscles in the 
region to send a strong message to destination ports and thus keep them in line. In 
1993 the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community met in Nassau and 
agreed to the concept of a minimum head tax to be levied on cruise passengers. 
Subsequently a figure of US$15 per passenger was agreed upon, but the cruise 
lines through the FCCA voiced their displeasure and threatened to remove the 13 
Caribbean Islands from their itineraries if the tax was imposed. This show of power 
had the desired effect and within a week, the islands broke ranks and never 
implemented the tax (http://www.history.pdx.edu/hdwp/economy/grenada_ec.html). 
Another glaring example of power play between cruise operators and destination 
ports occurred in 1999 when Carnival Cruise Lines gave notice of its immediate 
removal of Grenada from its itineraries. The cruise line cited the reason for this 
action as being its objection to a 1996 Environmental Levy 23  of US$1.50 per 
passenger that was imposed by islands of the Eastern Caribbean.  At the time of its 
withdrawal, Carnival was responsible for 50% of cruisers who visited Grenada 
(http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres115_99.htm). 
5.2.2 Substitutability of destinations  
 
The proximity of Caribbean islands to each other is one of the strategic advantages 
the region has over its competitors.  However, the general movement of cruise traffic 
towards the Western Caribbean has resulted in the loss of market share and the 
creation of excess capacity in other regional segments. The proximity of islands and 
the existence of excess capacity have weakened the negotiating power of 
destination ports and made it relatively easy to switch from one destination port to 
another.  
 
                                                 
23 This levy was to help meet the cost of solid waste reception and disposal arising from the operations 
of cruise vessels in the region. 
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The situation is worsened by the intensifying of competition between destination 
ports and according to Gibson (2006) this leads to a situation where port fees for 
many Caribbean islands are relatively inexpensive, ranging from US$4 to US$6 per 
customer. This point is supported by Wilmsmeier (2006) who states that individual 
ports have a weak negotiating position against the demands and threats of the 
cruise industry. Wilmsmeier further explained that terminals are often put in a 
position of having to make concessions to either keep ships coming back or to 
entice ships to come.    
 
The negotiating power of destination ports is further marginalized when cruise lines 
market their private islands as the true Caribbean experience and include them in 
cruise itineraries. This development is of particular concern to regular destination 
ports because it effectively means the cancellation of their ports whenever the 
option of calling at a private island is exercised (Robertsen, "n.d.").  Cruise lines 
have implicitly refuted this argument by explaining that it had become increasingly 
difficult marketing the same ports over and over again and in finding new ports of 
call.  It was thus their responsibility to stimulate the creation of new Caribbean ports 
by way of investment in private islands (Peisley, 2006). 
5.2.3 Market representation 
 
Section 3.4 of Chapter 3 introduced the Florida Caribbean Cruise Association 
(FCCA) and the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) as representative 
associations for the cruise lines.  The importance of cruising to the Caribbean 
(Peisley, 2006) became manifested during post 9/11 when in relation to land tourism 
which fell from 17.2 million in 2000 to 16.1 million in 2002; the number of cruisers 
steadily increased. This trend is illustrated in Figure 6, on page 11 of Chapter 2. 
 
Notwithstanding the above and in keeping with views expressed by ECLAC (2005),  
neither Caribbean governments nor Caribbean port authorities have seen it 
necessary to establish a regional cruise port association. The Caribbean Tourism 
Organisation 24(CTO) was established in January 1989. Its primary objective is to 
                                                 
24 Detailed information can be obtained from http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives/agreement-cto.htm
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provide to, and through its members, the services and information necessary for the 
development of sustainable tourism leading to the economic and social benefit of 
the Caribbean.  Essentially the CTO can and should be regarded as the official 
negotiating agency of destination ports.  
 
However, and according to a senior official at Trinidad & Tobago’s Ministry of 
Tourism, most destinations prefer to do their own negotiations on the premise that 
this will generate more vessel calls, higher visitor arrivals and thus high economic 
returns. This practice is detrimental to the region and weakens significantly any 
effective representation, which the CTO can provide. Therefore, by showing a 
preference to individualistic representation rather than collective bargaining, 
destination ports effectively transfers the balance of power to cruise operators.   
5.2.4 Cooperation among destination ports 
 
Reference is made to Section 5.2.1 where the issue of the US$15 head tax in 1993 
was discussed. It should be borne in mind that the Caribbean, within only one week, 
yielded to the wishes of cruise operators and refrained from implementing the 
agreed upon tax. A general lack of cooperation was thus displayed at a time when 
Cozumel was the only Mexican port to be actively engaged in cruise tourism and the 
globalization of the Caribbean cruise experience was still in its infancy stages. The 
Caribbean thus had the capacity in 1993 to insist on the implementation of the tax or 
negotiate an amount higher than the US$5 which currently exists. 
 
Pinnock, Saltibus, Joseph and Benjamin strongly supported the view that the 
intense level of competition for cruise tourism revenues at times could lead to 
mutual distrust and lack of cooperation among regional states. This lack of 
cooperation and individualism was seen to further erode the negotiating power of 
destination ports and create situations, which may make it easier for them to be 
manipulated by cruise operators.  According to Benjamin, “a chain is as strong as its 
weakest link, united we’ll stand but divided we’ll fall” (D. Saltibus; F. Pinnock; G. 
Benjamin; & L. Joseph, personal communications, July 12-18, 2007).  
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5.2.5 Dependence of destination ports on cruise tourism  
 
The Caribbean nations should never forget the name Las Casas de Bartolomé for it 
was his actions that marked the beginning of the dependency syndrome that 
characterizes the Caribbean’s economy. The high economic returns of sugar cane 
resulted in Las Casas convincing the King of Spain to order all available land to be 
used for sugar cultivation, and foods imported (Williams, 1970). 
 
Until the mid-20th century, the Caribbean relied heavily on its agricultural based 
economy, but when this was undermined by globalization, it diversified into tourism 
and became just as dependent on a tourism-based economy.  The Caribbean, it is 
argued is at least four times more dependent on tourism than any other region in the 
world (King, LeBlanc, & Lowe, 2000; Williams, 1970). 
 
Wilmsmeier (2006) agrees that the Caribbean is highly dependent on tourism and 
claims that this sector makes a contribution of 30 percent to 50 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of most Caribbean islands. Wilmsmeier singles out Antigua 
& Barbuda, and the Bahamas as destinations where tourism contributes 74 percent 
to 89 percent of GDP respectively.  Fish and Gunther, (as cited in Seidl, Guiliano, & 
Pratt, 2006) explain that this situation makes the local economy dependent upon the 
economic conditions of international consumers and on the global economic 
opportunities available to the cruise ship industry, rather than local economic 
conditions. 
5.3 Ship as a Destination  
 
Cruise operators have adopted a strategy of defining land-based resorts such as 
Orlando and Las Vegas as their competitors and thus design, promote and market 
their vessels as resort destinations. Destination ports, which were once the main 
attraction, are now seen as “extras along the way” since the vessel itself is the 
destination, which sells the cruise. Interestingly, the concept destinational cruising 
has now emerged to describe the situation whereby the ports and their attractions 
are central to the cruise. Coincidentally, this aspect of cruising is regarded as niche 
marketing (Cartwright & Baird, 1999; Robertsen, "n.d.").  
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According to Cartwright & Baird (1999) only one-third of the people who take a 
holiday take a cruise and cruise companies, realising this, decided to get the 
remainder onboard. This was achieved by building mega vessels, revolutionizing the 
work processes onboard through automation, and using the latest technologies for 
vessel propulsion. The resulting economies of scale and improvements in efficiency, 
lowered operational costs and generally made cruising more affordable for a wider 
cross section of the society.  Additionally, the available space in the now larger 
vessels, made it possible to include a range of attractions, such as ice-skating rinks, 
rock-climbing walls, boxing rings, surf pools, golf simulators, and multi-room villas 
with private pools and in-suite Jacuzzis (Mathisen, 2005; http://www.f-cca.com). 
 
The many innovative facilities and amenities provided onboard served the dual 
purpose of making cruise vessels an alternative to land-based resorts and gave 
passengers more opportunities to spend onboard.  McKee and Mamoozadeh, (as 
cited in Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt, 2006) explained that by marketing the ship as a 
destination, cruise operators sought to maximize the time (and money) cruisers 
spent onboard and minimize the time spent in port. This view is supported by 
Wilmsmeier (2006), who further explained that with depressed pricing, cruise 
operators combined strategies for increasing onboard revenue with strategies for 
decreasing costs. This, Wilmsmeier argued, was disadvantageous to port cities, 
since passengers after spending onboard the ship had less money to spend ashore. 
5.4 High Costs of Infrastructural Development  
 
Infrastructural developments, in particular those related to ports, are usually very   
costly. In most instances, governments, already under strict budgetary constrains, 
give concessions to taxi and tour operators to help stimulate investments for cruise 
tourism.  This view is shared by Peisley (2006, p. 198) who added that governments 
must give incentives to private companies to justify the extra investment to expand 
and improve their fleet.  The seasonality of the cruise industry, in addition to the 
absence of any guaranteed calls from cruise vessels make private investors regard 
port investments as high risk business ventures. This negative perception has been 
reinforced by ports investing substantially in their facilities only to have suffered 
severe loss of cruise business following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US. This 
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was evident in the general movement towards the Western Caribbean, the Mexican 
ports to be more exact.  
 
In some instances cruise lines indicate a willingness to partner with destination ports 
to either upgrade berths or construct new cruise facilities. However, their demands 
are sometimes unreasonable in nature and this will be illustrated by the following 
examples given of Belize and Jamaica in the Western Caribbean. 
 
In 2004 Carnival Cruise Lines (CCL) negotiated directly with Belizean Prime Minister 
Said Musa to construct the country’s first berthing facility at a cost of US$50 million. 
The pier, which would accommodate two vessels, would eliminate the need for 
tendering. The company guaranteed vessel calls for the next twenty five years and 
effectively assured the generation of US$ 2 billion in revenues for the country.  
However, since the contract was negotiated without any input from the Cabinet of 
Ministers or tourism regulatory agencies, it soon came under public scrutiny. An 
examination of the proposed contract revealed that CCL was entitled to exemptions 
from all taxes and duties, protected against new or increases in existing fees, and 
subject to no more than 3% increases in passenger head taxes after 2010. 
Additionally, Section 7 of the contract actually gave CCL the authority to override 
any law, policy or regulation which was enacted to limit the number of passengers 
who came ashore.  To date, as was seen in Section 5.1.1, Belize still does not have 
any berthing facilities which lead to the conclusion that the contract was rejected 
based on its bias towards CCL (CESD, 2006, pp. 36-40). 
 
The case of Jamaica involved Reynolds’ Pier, a multi-purpose port in Ocho Rios, 
which is used for cruise shipping as well as for the export of sugar and limestone.  
Cruise lines, having expressed concerns about the size of the port, indicated that 
Jamaica had lost over 200 calls in 2006 and the opportunity of realising almost 
US$5 billion in revenues. The cruise lines, therefore, called for Reynolds’ Pier to be 
converted to a tourism-only port and even offered to contribute towards the project if 
the expansion was approved (Davis, 2006).   
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The owners of the Pier, Jamaica Bauxite Mining (JBM), pledged their support 
towards expanding the facility to accommodate more cruise ships on condition that 
cruise shipping coexist with other commercial activities at Reynolds’ Pier. Faced 
with resistance from JMB, cruise operator RCCL hinted to the possibilities of 
Freedom of the Seas being diverted to Montego Bay if Ocho Rios could not put 
measures in placed to show its commitment towards cruise tourism.  This strategy of 
playing ports against each other is at times used by cruise operators to get 
destination ports to comply with their demands; in most instances they do comply 
(Davis, 2006).  
5.5 Chapter Analysis  
 
The island states of the Eastern, South and Deep Caribbean are among the 
smallest in the world. As previously mentioned, these islands are heavily dependent 
on foreign capital and on the economic purchasing power of international customers. 
This is readily seen from the economic decline experienced by most regional states 
in the aftermath of 9/11 and the recessionary effect that attack had on the US 
economy. This economic situation is made worse with many Caribbean islands lying 
directly in the path of hurricanes and other adverse weather systems originating 
from Africa. These tropical disturbances bring torrential rains and extremely powerful 
winds which often leave a trail of damage and destruction. Experts have claimed 
that the severity of storms is expected to increase due to the occurrence of climate 
change (Sullivan, 2005). 
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Table 10: Total External Debt of selected CARICOM states, 1995-2004 (Year-end balance, in $US Millions) 
COUNTRIES 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bahamas 305.0 349.0 328.0 309.0 362.0 343.0 
Western Caribbean             
Belize … 433.7 486.6 574.5 749.7 841.0 
Jamaica …. 3375.0 4146.0 4348.0 4192.0 5120.0 
Eastern Caribbean             
Antigua 286.8 471.8 496.1 540.9 575.8 335.1 
St. Kitts & Nevis 54.1 161.5 205.8 261.1 367.1 321.9 
South Caribbean             
Barbados 479.0 605.0 539.0 755.0 737.0 792.0 
Dominica 103.0 153.5 181.3 208.6 229.5 245.5 
St. Lucia 87.5 159.8 169.5 169.7 192.3 221.1 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 116.0 197.3 203.4 258.8 329.9 362.0 
Deep Caribbean             
Grenada 86.6 134.7 182.6 320.7 342.9 409.5 
Trinidad & Tobago 1876.0 1637.6 1665.9 1549.1 1553.0 1350.6 
Source: http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/26531/LCG2311B_2.pdf
 
Destination Ports desirous of being on the itineraries of cruise vessels are expected 
to have their ports in a state of readiness to accommodate the ever-increasing 
vessel size in terms of berthing space, logistical requirements and related shore 
attractions. Consideration must, however, be given to the ability of these destination 
ports to invest large sums of money in infrastructural developments and being 
severely restricted to effect cost recovery measures.  Most destination ports are 
island states with high levels of debt as illustrated in Table 10 which shows the total 
external debt of selected CARICOM states for the period 1995 to 2004. The 
combined costs of Royal Caribbean International’s three Freedom Class25 vessels 
which amount to US$2.16 billion can easily wipe out the total external debt of the 
Bahamas, Antigua, St. Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines. From Table 10, the total external debt in 2004 of these islands amounts 
to US$1.86 billion.  
 
Undoubtedly the cruise industry generates income for destination ports and 
contributes to their economies. However, the increasing size of vessels, high levels 
of market concentration, substitutability of destinations, lack of cooperation leading 
to poor market representation, the ship as a destination, heavy reliance on foreign 
capital, and the strings attached to joint ventures all tend to increase the vulnerability 
                                                 
25 The construction costs of one Freedom Class vessel is US$720 Million (See Table 9 of Section 5.1) 
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of destination ports. This high level of vulnerability appears to have placed the 
balance of power squarely on the shoulders of cruise operators and put destination 
ports in a position to be easily manipulated.  
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6 Industry Analysis 
 
 
The Caribbean, as indicated earlier, receives most of its cruise passengers from the 
US.  From the latter stages of 2006 into 2007 the major cruise operators have been 
faced with slow US growth and a consequential drop in their net revenue yields. In 
February 2007, Carnival Corporation (Fairplay, 2007b) indicated that full-year 2007 
yields, after the necessary currency adjustments, would actually fall by 1-2 percent. 
Faced with a 4.2 percent yield decline, RCCL chairman Richard Fain (as cited in 
Miller, 2007a) disclosed that growth in the Caribbean had leveled off and would 
most likely reach a plateau in 2008.  
 
 Normally, when faced with an economic downturn in the US, cruise companies use 
the ‘trade-down effect’ to cushion the accompanying impacts.  In that strategy (Miller, 
2007b) if low-end consumers drop out, the middle market consumers would 
normally replace them on cheaper cruises since they too, are expected to be 
prudent with their spending. This theory is however invalidated if the middle market 
is not affected in a similar manner to the lower stratum.  
 
Research conducted by Tim Conder of AG Edwards (as cited in Fairplay, 2007a) 
reveals that the Caribbean fall-off stems from a debt squeeze on lower demographic 
US consumers. This tends to weaken the ‘trade-down effect’ and negatively impacts 
the profitability of cruise operators as previously indicated. Conder is supported by 
Morgan Stanley’s chief US economist Richard Berner who asserts that the 
bifurcation of consumer spending in the US was fuelled by a growing income 
inequality, a manufacturing mini-recession, and other housing issues. Berner posits 
the view that this bifurcation developed over a period of time and would not end 
soon (Miller, 2007e).  
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6.1 Strategic Analysis of Cruise Operators 
 
Faced with the situation with fewer Americans traveling to the Caribbean, major 
cruise operators Carnival Corporation and RCCL are addressing the issue by 
diversifying from the Caribbean into Europe. RCCL brands, as a means of 
combating revenue loss in the Caribbean, have decided to sail 51 percent of berth-
day capacity in the Caribbean in 2007 as compared to 56 percent in 2006. 
 
 Alternatively, Carnival Cruise Lines, which has the highest Caribbean exposure and 
hence the most vulnerable, is cushioned from the impacts by parent company 
Carnival Corporation, which owns the most diversified and global brand portfolio. 
Carnival has therefore added incremental tonnage in Europe and the US West 
Coast, and plans on undertaking price reduction strategies as a means of bolstering 
occupancy  (Fairplay, 2007c; Miller, 2007a, 2007b, 2007e).  
 
According to Hill & Jones (1998, pp. 77-78), companies in consolidated industries 
are interdependent and the competitive action of one company may directly impact 
on the market share of its rivals. If left unchecked, Hill & Jones believed that the 
response of competitors could lead to a price war and thus constitute a major 
challenge for all concerned. Cruise operators have displayed a strong desire to 
avoid price wars and so compete on non-price factors such as advertising and 
promotions, brand positioning, and product quality, functionality and design.  
 
An example of this type of competition involves ship building and design. Carnival 
Cruise Lines, which normally focus on sundecks, bars and restaurants, upgrade 
vessels regularly with a great level of consistency being observed between one 
generation and the next. Alternatively, Royal Caribbean International upgrades are 
radically different from each other and introduce a wide array of innovations that are 
normally considered revolutionary changes for the industry. Examples include ice-
skating rinks, rock climbing walls and surf flowriders (Miller, 2007c). 
 
The risk of potential competitors entering the market is severely restricted by cruise 
operators who resort to building strong brand loyalty, using economies of scale to 
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reduce operational costs, and the internal transfer of assets. American cruisers have 
displayed a preference for new vessels and the major cruise operators, being very 
customer oriented, strive to meet that expressed wish. In the early years of cruising, 
old tonnage which was removed from the North American market was normally 
placed on the Sale and Purchase Markets where potential competitors could easily 
purchase well-maintained vessels. Today, this policy has changed and older 
tonnage is now transferred to global brands thus making it extremely difficult for new 
companies to get attractive second tonnage (Miller, 2007d).  
 
Cruise operators, constantly search for opportunities to achieve cost minimization 
and the trend from the late 90’s onwards has been to diversify and invest in 
destination ports as well as the acquisition of their own islands. Berths as well as 
shopping facilities are constructed in destination ports, and guaranteed calls are 
given in exchange for rebates on head tax and other concessions. Cost savings are 
also realized when vessels are built and equipped with Azipod propulsion systems 
thus allowing high levels of maneuverability. This drastically reduces the reliance on 
tugs and, consequently towage, expense. 
 
Cruise operators have been able to boost their revenue generating capacity by 
innovatively designing vessels to be destinations offering the same and sometimes 
more amenities than land-based hotels. Sale of land tours are done onboard and the 
needs of children as well as special interest groups, such as the disabled, are 
meticulously attended to. Unlike in the past when children were seen as distractions 
the trend today is to encourage families to bring them along (Speares, 2007).  
 
Land tours are seen as a major revenue stream for cruise operators who reap huge 
rewards without having to make any investment in that venture.  Cruise lines sell 
tours onboard to cruisers and charge a substantial mark up of almost 50 percent of 
what attains ashore.  Additionally, local tour operators are offered ‘preferred’ status 
in exchange for sometimes 40 percent of their gross sales (Seidl, Guiliano, & Pratt, 
2006). 
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In a new spirit of cooperation with destination ports, cruise operators, through the 
FCCA have introduced the Freestay Caribbean Cruise Conversion Programme 
(FCCCP). This programme is geared towards enticing cruisers to return for longer 
vacations at participating destinations.  FCCCP is currently running in Antigua, 
Barbados, Belize, Cozumel, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. 
Maarten, and the US Virgin Islands. Also, the FCCA, for the past 12 years, has been 
running a children’s essay contest which is aimed at two categories of children; a 
junior division for those aged 12 and below and a senior division of ages 13-16 
years.  Cruise operators thru the FCCA build awareness and acceptance in the 
region by tackling those most likely to bring about future change. The topic for 2006 
was “Why Should Your Destination be on a Cruise Ships’ Itinerary?” (Peisley, 2006; 
http://www.f-cca.com) 
6.2 Strategic Analysis of Destination Ports 
 
The majority of CARICOM nations are small developing states with limited land 
space, little economic and human resources, and largely dependent on their tourism 
sectors.  In the past, the region’s agricultural produce received preferential access to 
the European Market and many donor agencies provided aid in the form of grants 
and other non-monetary methods. However, as alluded to in Section 2.2, the 
preferential market access was ruled against by the WTO and currently, foreign aid 
flows to the region have declined substantially. It is believed that donor agencies 
have shifted focus to the war torn regions of Africa and the Middle East that are in 
more critical need of aid than the Caribbean. The apparently strong correlation 
between economic conditions in source markets and the purchasing power of 
cruisers places the region in a very vulnerable position, especially with tourism being 
a major GDP contributor (Caribbean Tourism Organization, 2007). 
 
CARICOM, being placed in such a vulnerable position and having lost considerable 
market share to the Western Caribbean, at times makes decisions that may not be 
in its long term interests. One pertinent example is that of the region, according to 
Saltibus, having the capacity to monitor cruise vessels, but deliberately 
circumventing that task. A number of CARICOM nationals have attended the World 
Maritime University and have been adequately equipped with the knowledge, skills, 
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and abilities required for conducting effective port state control surveys. However, 
surveyors are not given the finance nor the power to perform their tasks for fear that 
a particular island may be regarded as being too strict and thus removed from future 
itineraries (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).        
The Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI) was conceptualized in 1979 
by CARICOM’s Health Ministers and became a legal entity in 1988. The Institute 
was established to address environmental health concerns of the English-speaking 
Caribbean but to date has not undertaken any research related to cruise tourism 
and its environmental impact. This shortcoming of CEHI, and by extension 
CARICOM, happens at a time when the trend is to build mega vessels, which 
progressively bring more cruisers who, of course, generate more wastes. The 
Caribbean Tourism Organization (2007) did research revealing that the number of 
cruisers steadily increased from 36 percent of total tourist arrivals in 1980 to 48 
percent in 2004. This substantiates the growing importance of cruise tourism to the 
region and the potential risks that may be posed to the marine environment as well 
as to land based resources (http://www.cehi.org.lc/aboutus.htm; CEHI, personal 
communication, June 8, 2007).   
There has been a general apathy towards environmental concerns in CARICOM 
with destination ports being more concerned with economic gain. The very 
environmental levy charged to cruise vessels and which should be used to 
undertake research or to help mitigate against environmental degradation at 
attraction sites is not used for that purpose. Paragraph 3 of page 37 indicates that in 
most cases the revenues generated by the environmental levy are placed in 
governments’ consolidated fund. Saltibus posits the view that undertaking cruise 
ship environmental impact studies may be costly and thus are not undertaken by 
regional states. However, he strongly believes that if those states were not so laid 
back and had taken advantage of grant funds available in the past, then they would 
have been more informed about their ports and the environmental impacts of cruise 
vessels (D. Saltibus, personal communication, July 15, 2007).  
   
Positions of dominance may at times lead to complacency and result in loss of 
market share. This is readily apparent if cognizance is not taken of demographic 
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changes within customer groupings or the strategies of potential and existing 
competitors. Example is given of the West Indies Cricket Team, which, for several 
years dominated world cricket and for many, playing cricket was seen as an activity, 
which came naturally to West Indians. Whilst the West Indies were being 
complacent, their competitors saw cricket as a science and developed special 
institutions to improve their playing skills. This strategy worked, because today, the 
West Indies no longer dominates world cricket. Similarities exist between cricket and 
tourism with some destinations ports having a complacent attitude and thinking that 
the natural resources of sun, sea, and sand will always be the most sought after 
attributes of vacationers.  
 
Today, though the Caribbean maintains the accolade of most preferred cruise 
destination, high levels of complacency still exist. Examples to substantiate this 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• Mass production of souvenirs sold throughout the region with the only 
differentiating factor being the name of destination ports; 
• Continued reliance on the North American market and the marketing efforts 
of cruise operators to get more Americans onboard their ships (paragraph 2, 
Section 5.3, p.48); 
• Reliance on the FCCA to provide guidance on meeting the needs of the 
cruise industry rather than supplement the information obtained with 
research that should be undertaken by the Caribbean Tourism Organization.  
Irrespective of how helpful the FCCA may be, the fact still remains that it’s 
the representative agency of cruise operators and will first serve the interests 
of its members before that of destination ports. 
 
Cruise operators are transferring capacity away from the Caribbean to Europe and 
this is expected to reduce the Caribbean’s lower berth capacity from 5.8 million in 
2007 to 5.5 million in 2008.  Destination ports, though aware of this development are 
investing heavily in their facilities to accommodate increasingly larger vessels. This 
is a risky venture but since economies of scale generated by mega vessels makes it 
cheaper to cruise; regional ports want to be in a state of readiness to benefit from 
the flow of passengers if and when they should occur. 
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7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation had five key objectives and research was therefore undertaken 
with a view to obtaining information, some more detailed than others to better 
understand cruise tourism in the Caribbean and to (1) determine and evaluate the 
economic impact of cruise tourism in the Caribbean; (2) to ascertain the balance of 
power between cruise operators and destination ports; (3) to evaluate the capacity 
of destination ports to accommodate future mega-sized cruise vessels; (4) to 
determine the economic  and operational implications to liner shipping, of the priority 
berthing given to cruise vessels; and (5) are destination ports meeting their 
obligations as mandated by MARPOL 73/78 and providing port reception facilities 
for ship-generated wastes? 
 
In determining and evaluating the economic impact of cruise tourism on destination 
ports, research revealed that the vessel, passengers and crew onboard all 
generated revenues for destination ports.  In the cruise year 2005-2006, cruise 
tourism contributed US$1.77 billion to the economies of 19 destination ports with 
13.7 million passengers spending US$1.3 billion, 2.6 million crew spent US$194 
million, and cruise line expenditure amounting to US$267 million.  On the whole, 
24,540 direct jobs and 16,960 indirect jobs were created from the US$1.77 billion 
generated within the 19 destination ports.  
 
A closer analysis however reveals that the economic impact of cruise tourism on 
destination ports is significantly reduced by marketing strategies of cruise operators, 
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and high levels of competition among destination ports. A current situation which will 
have dire future consequences for destination ports is that of technological 
advancements which enhance the manoeuvrability of modern vessels. To begin with, 
when cruise vessels are marketed as destinations in themselves, this significantly 
reduces the purchasing power of cruisers when venturing ashore since money is 
also being spent onboard. Another factor which puts downward pressure on the 
positive economic impacts of cruise tourism is the intense competition between 
destination ports, which often results in ports charging very low fees for their 
services.  This lack of co-operation among destination ports adversely affects their 
earning capacity and places them in vulnerable positions where they may be 
exploited by cruise operators into giving absurd concessions to be placed on 
itineraries.   
 
Finally, the Azipod propulsion systems installed onboard recently built cruise vessels 
may enhance manoeuvrability to the point that tugs are not needed and cost savings 
thus realised.  However, with Azipods, the propeller, rather than being on a fixed 
shaft and facing away from the vessel’s stern now has the ability to rotate 360°.  
This means that to move a mega-sized vessel away from a berth the propeller must 
be placed at right angles to the vessel’s stern, then considerable power must be 
applied in order to effect movement away from the berth. This seriously undermines 
berth foundations and in the near future may pose considerable challenges for 
destination ports and erode the gains made from cruise tourism. 
 
The balance of power is without doubt in the hands of cruise operators and to really 
appreciate the amount of power wielded by these operators due cognizance must 
be given to the situation which unfolds in Table 11.  
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Table 11: Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for cruise operators for the period 1996 & 2005 
Operators 1996  Operators 2005 
  Capacity % H   Capacity % H 
C C 33992.0 34.5 1190 C C 137025 55 3025 
RCI 18930.0 19.2 369 RCCL 62246 25 625 
P&O Princess plc 16704.0 16.9 286 Star Group 27316 11 121 
NCL 8908.0 9.0 81 Others 7552.9 3 9 
Celebrity 8278.0 8.4 71 Others 7552.9 3 9 
Costa Crociere 7755.0 7.9 62 Others 7552.9 3 9 
Cunard 3500.0 3.5 12        
Seabourn 477.0 0.5 0        
Others 120.0 0.0 0        
Total 98664.0 100.0% 2071   249245.7 100.0% 3798 
Source: Data taken from G.P. Wild (International) Limited 2006, Cruise Industry News 2005, WTO, 
2003 and the HHI concept from Cariou, 2007 
 
According to the DOJ’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines  (as cited in Cariou, 2007) 
a market in which the HHI is:  
• below 1000 is “un-concentrated” 
• between 1000 and 1800 is “moderately concentrated” 
• and above 1800 is “highly concentrated”. 
 
In 1996 (Table 11) the HHI was 2068 and the cruise sector at that time was already 
considered to be highly concentrated. Nine years later, after a spate of mergers and 
acquisitions, the HHI was calculated to be 3794. This “extreme” level of 
concentration, substitutability of destinations, trend of marketing the ship as a 
destination, and the heavy reliance on foreign capital have all contributed to the 
current vulnerability of destination ports. It has been found that this vulnerability has 
led to situations whereby cruise operators play islands against each other and 
display a willingness (case of Grenada in 1993)  to remove islands from their 
itineraries if the line is not towed.  
 
Though the economic status of small island developing states necessitates some 
form of foreign injection of capital, destination ports are practically to be blamed for 
the current state of affairs. Rather than co-operate and move forward as a cohesive 
group, utilizing regional agencies such as the Caribbean Tourism organisation, 
CARICOM states all compete with each other to be the preferred destination on 
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cruise itineraries.  The practice of relying on agencies of cruise operators to market 
their destinations further deepens the dependency syndrome, to the extent that the 
industry is being developed to suit the interests of cruise operators. 
 
On the whole, marketing strategies such as the Freestay Caribbean Cruise 
Conversion Programme and the children’s essay contest may be viewed as a 
means of subtly gaining widespread acceptance for the policies of cruise operators 
and thus reinforcing their power. 
 
With regards to the capacity to accommodate mega-sized cruise vessels in the 
future, it was found that most destinations had that capacity. This assertion is being 
made because in the past when berthing infrastructure and water depth were largely 
inadequate, cruise vessels berthed at the anchorage and used tenders to transfer 
passengers from ship to shore and back.  However, though there is no limit to the 
size of vessel a destination port can receive, there are limitations to the size that can 
be accommodated alongside a physical berth.   
 
Destination ports such as Belize and the Cayman Islands continue to operate as in 
previous times and still do not have any physical berthing structures.  Yet, these 
ports have such a high intrinsic value, that vessels go to the anchorage and tender 
ashore.  St. Maarten is no exception and during the peak of the cruise season may 
have as many as six to nine cruise vessels call a day. The point that must be 
highlighted is that St. Maarten can only accommodate alongside three (3) Voyage 
Class vessels. 
 
The three main drawbacks to berthing at the anchorage are the logistical headache 
of getting all passengers ashore in time for their shore excursions, the likelihood of 
the seas being choppy resulting in a not too comfortable time for tendering, and 
preference given to passengers rather than crew in going ashore.  As discussed 
earlier, crew expenditure is a potential source of revenue to destination ports and 
when the numbers going ashore lessen so does their economic contribution. 
 
 68 
 
Worldwide, it is the norm to give priority berthing to cruise vessels and in small ports 
with multipurpose berths the effects of this policy is more readily apparent.  
Research revealed that it was common practice for liner trades to either spend 
several hours at the anchorage waiting for cruise vessels to sail or adjust their 
arrival times to coincide with their departures. This situation has been in existence 
for so many years that it can safely be asserted that liner trades in the Caribbean, 
especially during the cruise season do not operate as per industry standards.  
 
It is of significance to mention that Port Authorities operate on a 24-hour basis and 
therefore regard night operations as the most practicable alternative available to 
liner shipping. In most cases, if cruise vessels are expected the following day, 
container vessels are expected to vacate berths at a specific time irrespective of 
whether operations are completed or not. When faced with such choices preference 
is not always given to loading empty containers and the end result is often high 
levels of congestion in container yards.  Port Authorities do not always consider the 
monetary costs associated with increased waiting time, working at nights during 
overtime hours, or even their congested yards. 
 
The economic implications of the priority berthing given to cruise vessels are felt 
through out the economy and is reflected in the prices of consumer and producer 
goods.  This is so because the additional costs incurred when working at nights and 
the extra surcharge levied by vessel owners and associations, due to long delay in 
berthing, is often passed on to the final consumer. 
    
The final objective sought to determine whether destination ports were, as per 
Regulation 12 (1) of Annex I, Regulation 10 (1) of Annex IV, and Regulation 7 (1) of 
Annex V of MARPOL 73/78, meeting their obligations and providing port reception 
facilities for ship-generated wastes. Research revealed that the Convention 
designating the Wider Caribbean region as a Special Area has to date, not taken 
effect because of the failure of Caribbean states to provide port reception facilities. 
Reasons for the current situation were not obtained.  However, it can reasonably be 
assumed that cost implications and lack of regional commitment towards 
environmental protection are possible reasons for this shortfall. 
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 7.2 Recommendations 
 
The individualistic behaviour, the burning desire to make money irrespective of 
environmental costs, and the lack of co-operation among destination ports is the 
root of all issues facing destination ports in CARICOM.  In light of this, the CSME 
has been identified as the tool which must be used to remedy the regional ills 
mentioned above. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus which established the 
CSME also gave birth to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and gave the CCJ 
exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction in interpreting and applying the provisions of 
the Treaty.  In light of this, the CCJ should be regarded as the central agency 
empowered to take legal action against member state found guilty of breaching of 
legislation.  In that regard, a CSME with the regulatory powers similar to the 
European Commission should seek to implement the following recommendations: 
7.2.1 Formation of tourism/agriculture linkages 
 
The Caribbean’s very fertile agricultural soils should be used to develop synergies 
between agriculture and tourism. Rather than viewing taxes as the only means to 
increase revenues, linkages between agriculture and tourism should be seen as an 
alternative form of revenue generation. With such a linkage, fruits, crops and 
vegetables can be grown and sold to cruise vessels thus lessening the high farmer-
unemployment levels which resulted from the WTO ruling mentioned in Section 2.2 
on page 2. This will reduce the high dependence on cruise tourism since land-based 
resorts can also be partners in this enterprise.    
7.2.2 Employment of Caribbean nationals 
 
The Caribbean, by virtue of being actively involved in land-based tourism for several 
years, has a pool of workers who are trained to perform a variety of tourism related 
functions.  Considering that cruise operators are always seeking to minimize 
operational costs, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) should 
approach cruise operators with an employment proposal for regional tourism 
workers, highlighting the extremely low repatriating costs of CARICOM nationals in 
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comparison to other nationalities. The Caribbean Maritime Institute should be 
utilized to provide the requisite level of maritime training to shore-based tourism 
workers to facilitate their employment onboard cruise vessels.   
7.2.3 Development of a cruise ship policy 
 
A cruise ship policy should be developed to address the variances in passenger 
taxes, and the adhoc arrangements made for the collection, transportation and 
disposal of ship-generated wastes.  Apart from this, the scheduling of vessel calls26 
and over-crowding of shore attraction sites should be attended to with some level of 
urgency. This policy should therefore incorporate a movement geared towards 
developing an ecotourism based industry where cruise operators and destination 
ports alike will develop sound environmental practices for a sustainable tourism 
product. Decisions on the location and number of port reception facilities must be 
made as well as the selection of the most feasible cost recovery methods. 
 
7.2.4 Product differentiation 
 
There is a critical need to focus more on factors which differentiate islands from 
each other and emphasize these differences. Sea, sun, and sand should always be 
used to market the region but due regard should be taken of the changing 
demography of cruisers who may be looking for more than the traditional attractions. 
Example is given of the development and growth of Alaska as a cruise destination, 
one which is radically different from the Caribbean in every respect.  In that regard, 
innovative ways should be developed to highlight the Caribbean’s rich and colourful 
history.  For example, empty army barracks and a little imagination could be used to 
recreate the atmosphere that prevailed during the times when the world’s super 
powers fought relentlessly for control over this small chain of islands.  
 
 
 
                                                 
26 At times, five or more vessels may call at a port on one week day whilst other days may only have 
as little as one or two. 
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7.2.5 Strategic partnerships with cruise operators 
 
Strategic partnerships with cruise operators should be pursued for investment in port 
infrastructure, and innovative shore excursions should be developed-those with the 
“wow” effect but with a “tropical twist”. Such partnerships will best serve as an 
incentive for risk averse investors to invest in the industry and help alleviate the 
quality, diversity, and sustainability of the region’s tourism product. The collective 
negotiations will foster a more equitable exchange whereby destination ports will not 
be at risk of being made worse off with draconian deals such as the one mentioned 
in Section 5.4 on page 49 between Carnival Cruise Lines and Belize.  
 
In this world of wars, genocides, and increasing acts of terror the serenity of the 
Caribbean will always make the region a much sought after destination.  The key 
stakeholders in the industry, namely cruise operators and destination ports, have a 
responsibility to develop in the Caribbean cruise industry in a sustainable manner to 
facilitate the continuance of the industry as well as its long term profitability.  Any 
action contrary to this will ultimately result in cruise operators and destination ports 
killing the goose that lay the golden egg. 
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Appendix A-1: Carnival Corporation 
 
Accounting Year End: 30 November  
Item       2004 I             2003 I        2002 I        2001 I      2000 
                                        
Profit and Loss      
Sales 9727000 6718000 4368269 4535751 3778542 
Of which cruise 9427000 6459000 4229124 4357942 3578372 
Profit before interest 2173000 1383000 1042059 1034635 1007654 
Of which cruise operating profit 2083000 1371000 1065797 0 0 
Net income 1854000 1194000 1015941 926200 965458 
Income before tax 1901000 1223000 959379 913343 966552 
Exports n.a  1075736 1045388 597875 
Non-operating income -5000 8000 42011 34469 -17500 
Depreciation 812000 585000 382343 372224 287667 
Interest expense 267000 168000 78600 120692 41372 
Auditors fees n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Director's emoluments n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Employee pay n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
No. of employees n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Balance Sheet      
Tangible fixed assets 20823000 17522000 10115404 8390230 8001318 
Of which ships 22572000 18134000 10665958 8892412 8575563 
Intangible assets 3321000 3031000 681056 651814 701385 
Intermediate assets 1764000 1806000 406236 562520 579135 
Total Fixed Assets 25908000 22359000 11202696 9604564 9281838 
Stocks 240000 171000 91310 91996 100451 
Trade debtors 409000 403000 108327 90763 95361 
Other current assets 1079000 1558000 932515 1776229 353670 
Total Current Assets 1728000 2132000 1132152 1958988 549482 
Total Assets 27636000 24491000 12334848 11563552 9831320 
      
Trade creditors 631000 645000 268687 269467 332694 
Short term loans 1062000 94000 148642 21764 248219 
Other current liabilities 3341000 2576000 1202477 1189009 1134381 
Total Current Liabilities 5034000 3315000 1619806 1480240 1715294 
TA Minus TCL 22602000 21176000 10715042 10083312 8116026 
      
Long term loans 6291000 6918000 3011969 2954854 2099077 
Other UT liabilities 551000 465000 285170 537681 146332 
Total Capital & Reserves 15760000 13793000 7417903 6590777 5870617 
Capital Employed 22602000 21176000 10715042 10083312 8116026 
      
Earnings Per Share ($) 2.31 1.66 1.73 1.58 1.61
Performance Analysis      
Profitability Ratios      
Return on Total Assets (%) 6.9 5.0 7.8 7.9 9.8
Return on Capital (%J 8.4 5.8 9.0 9.1 11.9
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%) 19.5 18.2 22.0 20.1 25.6
Return on Investment (%) 9.2 6.5 9.6 10.2 12.1
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%) 12.1 8.9 12.9 13.9 16.5
Liquidity Ratios      
Quick Ratio (Acid Test) 0.30 0.59 0.64 1.26 0.26
Current Ratio 0.34 0.64 0.70 1.32 0.32
Gearing Ratios      
Equity Gearing (%) 132.7 128.9 150.9 132.5 148.2
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%) 59.1 65.2 46.9 50.1 45.4
Income Gearing (%) 12.3 12.1 7.5 11.7 4.1
Efficiency Ratios      
Debtor Days Outstanding 15 22 9 7 9 
Creditor Days 24 35 22 22 32 
Stocks/ Sales (%) 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.7
Asset Utilisation 0.35 0.27 0.35 0.39 0.38
Working Capital/ Sales (%) -33.99 -17.61 -11.16 10.55 -30.85
Sales/ Fixed Assets 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.54 0.47
Sales/ Capital Employed 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.45 0.47
Employee Performance      
Pay/ Sales (%) n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Profit/ Employee n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Sales/ Employee n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Capital Employed/ Employee n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
   Fixed Assets/ Employee n.a n.a na n.a n.a 
Pay/ Employee            n.a 
Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
n.a n.a n.a n.a 
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2005 I 2004 Year  
$m 
Revenue 11,087 9,727 
Operating costs and expenses 6,217 5,457 
Operating Profit Before Depredation & Amortization 3,541 2,985 
Depredation & Amortization 902 812 
Operating Income after D & A 2,639 2,173 
Pre-Tax Income (EBT) 2,330 1,901 
Net Income after tax 2,257 1,901 
Income per share (basic) 2.80 2.31 
Profit Margin 21.0 19.5 
 Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
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Appendix A-2: Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited 
 
 
Accounting Year Ending: 31 December  
2004 1 2003 i 2002 J 2001 I 2000 Item 
$('000s) 
Profit and Loss      
Sales 4555375 3784249 3434347 3145250 2865846
Profit before interest 784668 549062 618126 507664 599691
Of which cruise operating profit 753589 526185 550975 455605 569540
Net income 474691 280664 351284 254457 445363
Income before tax 474691 280664 351284 254457 445363
Exports 694656 527260 466190 n.a n.a
Non-operating income 31079 22877 67151 52026 30151
Depreciation 394136 362695 339100 301174 231048
Interest expense 309977 268398 266842 253207 154328
Auditors fees n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Director's emoluments n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Employee pay 487633 426462 314370 283919 0
No. of employees n.a n.a 24500 24500 20000
Balance Sheet      
Tangible fixed assets 10193443 9943495 9276484 8605448 6831809
Of which ships 11056851 10536947 9404959 8289028 6168383
Intangible assets 278561 278561 278561 278561 288974
Intermediate assets 631474 526136 535743 598659 396963
Total Fixed Assets 11103478 10748192 10090788 9482668 7517746
Stocks 60260 53277 37299 33493 30115
Trade debtors 84899 89489 79535 72196 53609
Other current assets 715447 431784 330909 780425 226995
Totat Current Assets 860606 574550 447743 886114 310719
Total Assets 11964084 11322742 10538531 10368782 7828465
      
Trade creditors 162973 187756 171153 144070 158143
Short term loans 905374 315232 122544 238581 109926
Other current liabilities 1205155 1001539 876236 729998 644311
Total Current Liabilities 2273502 1504527 1169933 1112649 912380
TA Minus TCL 9690582 9818215 9368598 9256133 6916085
      
Long term loans 4826570 5520572 5322294 5407531 3300170
Other UT liabilities 59492 34746 11610 92018. 0
Total Capital & Reserves 4804520 4262897 4034694 3756584 3615915
Capital Employed 9690582 9818215 9368598 9256133 6916085
      
Earnings Per Share (UD$ diluted) 2.26 1A2 1.76 1.32 2.31
Performance Analysis      
Profitability Ratios      
Return on Total Assets (%) 4.0 2.5 3.3 2.5 5.7
Return on Capital (%) 4.9' 2.9 3.7 2.7 6.4
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%) 10.4 7.4 10.2 8.1 15.5
Return on Investment (%) 7.4 5.4 6.5 5.3 8.5
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%) 9.9 6.6 8.7 6.8 12.3
Liquidity Ratios      
Quick Ratio (Acid Test) 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.77 0.31
Current Ratio 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.80 0.34
Gearing Ratios      
Equity Gearing (%) 67.1 60.4 62.0 56.8 85.8
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%) 126.6 146.5 145.0 162.3 102.5
Income Gearing (%) 39.5 48.9 43.2 49.9 25.7
Efficiency Ratios      
Debtor Days Outstanding 7 9 8 8 7
Creditor Days 13 18 18 17 20
Stocks/ Sales (%) 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1
Asset Utilisation 0.38 0.33 0.33, 0.30 0.37
Working Capital/ Sales (%) -31.02 -24.57 -21.03 -7.20 -20.99
'Sales/ Fixed Assets 0.45_ 0.38 0.37 0.37' 0.42
Sales/ Capital Employed 0.47 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.41
Employee Performance      
Pay/ Sales (%) 10.70 11.27 9.15 9.03 0.00
Profit/ Employee n.a n.a 14338 10386 22268
Sales/ Employee n.a n.a 140177 128378 143292.
Capital Emplo -d/ Em Jo -e n.a n.a 382392 377801 345804'
Fixed Assets/ Employee n.a, n.a 378632 351243 341590.
Pay/ Employee n.a n.a 12831 11589 0
Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
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2005 ~ 2004 Year 
                                                  $                                         $ 
Passenger ticket revenues 3,609,487 3,359,201 
Onboard and other revenues 1,293,687 1,196,174 
Total revenues 4,903,174 4,555,375 
Operating costs 2,994,232 2,819,383 
Operating income 871,565 753,589 
Net income 715,956 474,691 
Earnings Per Share (Basic) 3.47 2.39 
Assumed profit margin (%) 14.6 10.4 
     Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
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Appendix A-3: Star Cruise Group 
 
    Accounting Year Ending: 31 December 
2004 I 2003 I 2002 I 2001 2000 Item 
$('000s) 
Profit and Loss      
Sales 1,636,405 1,618,208 1,573,588 1,381,566 1,326,743
Of which cruise 1631439 1615724 1,570,507 1,369,051 1,312,715
Profit before interest 120466 -20496 160,842 84,541 159,799
Of which cruise operating profit 135465 79049 73406 73406 152306
Net income -9006 -124473 50931 -16043 -44000
Income before tax -8035 -122810 52,406 -14,284 -20,318
Exports 0 0 0 0 0
Non-operating income -20935 -8510 -9110 19667 -180117
Depreciation 181909 197349 176166 154417 139929
Interest expense 107566 93804 99326 118492 0
Auditors fees 995 856 912 1073 858
Director's emoluments 6871 7809 6,331 4,692 4,648
Employee pay 338159 306769 249,577 224,823 206,898
No. of employees n.a n.a n.a 11,976 n.a
Balance Sheet      
Tangible fixed assets 3823302 3626873 3558448 3296768 2888148
Of which ships 3737811 13357000 3084361 3084361 2716491
Intangible assets 605286 621750 609733 626138 639036
Intermediate assets 100780 39839 18052 10664 20512
Total Fixed Assets 4529368 4288462 4186233 3933570 3547696
Stocks 42059 38075 40302 32871 28329
Trade debtors 12089 17423 16,424 25,398 19,920
Other current assets 401597 452031 515,738 227,147 333,312
Total Current Assets 455745 507529 572464 285416 381561
Total Assets 4985113 4795991 4758697 4218986 3929257
      
Trade creditors 83481 98950 108774 109293 76092
Short term loans 179159 1074226 340,187 94,551 263,573
Other current liabilities 483324 426538 387,314 310,169 288,418
Total Current Liabilities 745964 1599714 836275 514013 628083
TA Minus TCL 4239149 3196277 3922422 3704973 3301174
      
Long term loans 2238904 1199567 2093838 2120564 1696044
Other UT liabilities 186273 188194 9,054 10168 10193
Total Capital & Reserves 1813972 1808516 1819530 1574241 1594937
Capital Employed 4239149 3196277 3922422 3704973 3301174
Earnings per share (basic, cents) -0.17 -2.51 n.a n.a n.a
Performance Analysis   
Profitability Ratios      
Return on Total Assets (%) -0.2 -2.6 1.1 -0.3 -0.5
Return on Capital (%) -0.2 -3.8 1.3 -0.4 -0.6
Pre-tax Profit Margin (%) -0.5 -7.6 3.3 -1.0 -1.5
Return on Investment (%) 2.3 -0.7 3.6 2.7 -0.6
Return on Total Capital and Reserves (%) -0.4 -6.2 2.9 -0.9 -1.3
Liquidity Ratios      
Quick Ratio (Acid Test) 0.55 0.29 0.64 0.49 0.56 
Current Ratio 0.61 0.32 0.68 0.56 0.61 
Gearing Ratios      
Equity Gearing (%) 57.2 70.8 61.9 59.5 68.3
Total Debt/ Net Worth (%) 200.1 166.4 201.2 233.6 205.0
Income Gearing (%) 89.3 -457.7 61.8 140.2 0.0
Efficiency Ratios      
Debtor Days Outstanding 3 4 4 7 5
Creditor Days 19 22 25 29 21
Stocks/ Sales (%) 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1
Asset Utilisation 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Working Capital/ Sales (%) -17.74 -67.49 -16.76 -16.55 -18.58 
Sales/ Fixed Assets 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.46 
Sales/ Capital Employed 0.39 0.51 0.40 0.37 0.40 
Employee Performance      
Pay/ Sales (%) 20.66 18.96 15.86 16.27 15.59 
Profit/ Employee n.a n.a n.a -1193 n.a
Sales/ Employee n.a n.a n.a 115361 n.a
Capital Employed/ Employee n.a n.a n.a 309366 n.a
Fixed Assets/ Employee n.a n.a n.a 275281 n.a
Pay/ Employee n.a n.a n.a 18773 n.a
    Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
 
 
 
 80 
 
 81 
 
 
 
 
Year 2005
                 Q1 to Q3 
                                       $                                              $ 
Total revenues 1,443,186 1,282,808 
Operating costs 974,335 838,473 
Operating income 131,963 115,365 
Pre-tax profit 46,122 28,911 
Net income 43,613 28,241 
Earnings Per Share (Basic) 0.82 0.53 
Profit margin (%) 32 2.3 
                Source: G. P. Wild (International Limited from Company Annual Reports 
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Appendix B: Break down of Cruise Tourism Expenditure by Segment, 2005-2006 Cruise Year 
 
 
Destinations 
Totat Pax 
Onboard 
(Thousands) 
Pax* 
Onshore 
Visits 
(Thousands) 
Total Pax 
Expenditures 
($US Millions) 
Totat 
Crew 
Onboard 
(Thousands) 
Crew 
Onshore 
Visits 
(Thousands) 
Total 
Crew 
Exp.**    
($US 
Millions) 
Cruiseline 
Exp.**     
($US 
Millions) 
Total 
Exp.**    
($US 
Millions) 
Direct 
Employment 
Indirect 
Employment
Total 
Employment Population 
Direct 
Employee 
Wage 
Income 
($US Millions) 
Indirect 
Employee 
Wage 
Income 
($US Millions) 
Total 
Employee 
Wage 
Income 
($US 
Millions) 
Bahamas 1,981.8 1,585.5 96.0 799.4 279.8 5.6 42.8 144.4 2,235 1,730 3,965  34.3 26.6 60.9 
Total 
Bahamas 1,981.8 1,585.5 96.0 799.4 279.8 5.6 42.8 144.4 2,235 1,730 3,965  34.3 26.6 60.9 
Belize 726.6 610.4 53.6 288.6 72.1 1.3 9.3 64.2 1,215 670 1,885 300,000 12.9 7.0 19.9 
Cayman 
Islands 1,857.2 1,671.5 138.3 747.7 261.7 12.0 29.4 179.7 2,090 1,615 3,705 23,800 37.2 28.8 66.0 
Cozumel 2,142.3 1,713.9 157.0 891.0 356.4 17.4 39.5 213.9 3,715 2,230 5,945  25.4 15.4 40.8 
Costa Maya  757.4 605.9 46.2 295.0 147.5 7.4 6.6 60.2 1,115 655 1,770  7.3 4.4 11.7 
Key West 907.1 852.6 47.1 368.1 147.3 9.0 12.6 68.7 755 505 1,260  17.2 18.2 35.4 
Total Western 
Caribbean 6,390.6 5,454.3 442.2 2,590.4 985.0 47.1 97.4 586.7 8,890 5,675 14,565  100.0 73.8 173.8 
Antigua 460.4 391.4 32.9 197.2 78.9 4.1 4.0 41.0 720 495 1,215 65,962 6.1 4.3 10.4 
Puerto Rico 1,296.5 1,186.6 115.0 509.6 203.9 18.6 36.4 170.0 2,225 1,640 3,865 3,522,037 30.4 25.0 55.4 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis 117.2 93.8 5.4 48.8 19.5 0.4 0.9 6.7 125 80 205 42,291 0.9 0.6 1.5 
St. Marteen 1,449.2 1,304.3 189.3 724.5 289.8 46.2 10.9 246.4 3,210 2,380 5,590 61,967 57.0 42.3 99.3 
US Virgin 
Islands 1,812.8 1,631.5 288.3 703.0 351.5 50.6 22.7 361.6 3,525 2,640 6,165 101,809 77.7 57.9 135.6 
Total Eastern 
Caribbean 5,136.1 4,607.6 630.9 2,183.1 943.6 119.9 74.9 825.7 9,805 7,235 17,040  172.1 130.1 302.2 
Barbados 506.6 405.3 45.3 207.1 82.8 6.3 5.7 57.3 950 685 1,635 257,083 9.7 7.1 16.8 
Dominica 223.5 190.0 9.7 88.5 35.4 2.6 1.5 13.8 255 135 390 71,183 1.9 1.1 3.0 
Martinique 91.1 77.5 3.0 46.9 18.8 0.5 0.5 4.0 70 45 115 363,031 0.5 0.3 0.8 
St. Lucia 432.2 345.7 28.6 190.7 76.3 2.4 3.8 34.8 685 350 1,035 152,335 4.5 2.2 6.7 
Total South’n 
Caribbean 1,253.4 1,018.5 86.6 533.2 213.3 11.8 11.5 109.9 1,960 1,215 3,175  16.6 10.7 27.3 
Aruba 563.1 478.6 54.2 223.9 89.6 7.0 5.0 66.2 985 725 1,710 65,100 14.1 10.5 24.6 
Cartagena 38.1 32.4 3.7 17.2 5.2 0.2 0.6 4.5 95 45 140  0.5 0.3 0.8 
Curacao 298.5 253.8 13.5 120.3 42.1 1.6 2.9 18.0 250 170 420 143,816 4.4 3.1 7.5 
Grenada 289.6 246.2 13.2 125.0 50.0 1.3 1.8 16.3 320 165 485 96,600 2.1 1.0 3.1 
Total Deep 
Caribbean 1,189.3 1,011.0 84.6 486.4 186.9 10.1 10.3 105.0 1,650 1,105 2,755  21.1 14.9 36.0 
Totals 15,951.2 13,676.9 $1,340.3 6,592.5 2,608.6 $194.5 $236.9 $1,771.7 24,540.0 16,960.0 41,500.0   $344.10 $256.10 $600.2 
Source: Own compilation from Wild, 2006,WTO, 2003; Moonie et al, 1998; Cruise Industry News, 2005 
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